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ABSTRACT
Public pensions are horribly unfunded; millions of public 
employees are being forced to make greater contributions to their 
pensions; retirees are being forced to take benefit cuts; retirement 
ages and service requirements are being increased; and the list goes 
on and on. These alarming developments involve all levels of 
American government, from the recent move to require new federal 
employees to contribute more to their pensions, to the significant 
underfunding of state and local public pension funds across the 
country, to the sad spectacle of the Detroit municipal bankruptcy 
where the plight of public pensions plays a leading role in that 
drama.
As a result, government officials, employees, and retirees are in 
the midst of litigating for the future of American public pensions. 
This Article, for the first time, focuses on all three levels of American 
government (federal, state, and local) and reviews the current status 
of pension litigation at each level. After discussing the federal 
employee pension system in the United States, the Article then 
considers one state’s (Wisconsin’s) recent experience with pension-
reform legislation and litigation, and one city’s (Detroit’s) 
experience with the municipal bankruptcy process to illustrate 
emerging trends in American public pension litigation.
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The start of a solution lies with harmonizing and standardizing 
the existing hodgepodge of American public pension law. Although 
ERISA is far from perfect in regulating private-sector pension plans 
in the United States, it nevertheless has provided uniform standards 
for management and administration of employer-sponsored 
retirement plans. To replicate that same consistency, this Article 
proposes a hybrid approach, which seeks to avoid some of the 
federalism pitfalls of previous public pension-reform proposals. By 
applying ERISA to federal employee pension plans, and by 
permitting states to adopt uniform, state-wide pension legislation, 
public pension plans can take advantage of reliable and stringent 
pension frameworks that will make future underfunding and plan-
fiduciary lapses less likely.
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INTRODUCTION
It is nearly impossible in the United States today to go long
without reading a headline about some aspect of the American public 
pension crisis or about some state undertaking public pension 
reform.1 Public pensions are horribly unfunded;2 millions of public 
employees are being forced to make greater contributions to their 
1. See Hazel Bradford, Pace of Pension Reform Ebbs After 49 States 
Change Laws, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 14, 2014, available at
www.pionline.com/article/20140414/PRINT/304149975/pace-of-pension-reform-
ebbs-after-49-states-change-laws (“The financial crisis and its aftermath sparked 
some kind of pension reform in every state except Idaho.”); Mark Miller, How Much 
Are Public-Sector Pensions Shrinking? Often, A Lot, REUTERS (May 20, 2014, 10:38 
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/us-column-miller-pensions-
idUSBREA4J0IV20140520 (“You’d have to be living in a cave not to have heard 
that many states are bailing out struggling pension plans by cutting benefits.”).
2. The Pew Center on the States estimates that the total cost of providing 
pension benefits to all public employees in the United States will exceed over $2.73 
trillion dollars and that the average total funding level is only at about 85%, or $2
trillion dollars right now. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP:
UNDERFUNDED STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND THE ROADS TO REFORM 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/
2010/TrillionDollarGapUnderfundedStateRetirementSystemsandtheRoadstoReform
pdf.pdf. Others have estimated the aggregate public pension plan deficit in the 
United States as high as $3.39 trillion dollars. See Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. 
Rauh, Policy Options for State Pension Systems and Their Impact on Plan 
Liabilities, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 173, 181 (2011); see also Alicia H. Munnell 
et al., The Funding of State and Local Pensions: 2012-2016, 32 CENTER FOR 
RETIREMENT RES. (2013), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/slp_32-508.pdf (estimating funding deficit at $3.8 trillion 
based on 2012 numbers).
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pensions;3 retirees are being forced to take benefit cuts;4 retirement 
ages and service requirements are being increased; and the list goes 
on and on.5
These headlines involve all levels of American government, 
from the recent move to require new federal employees to contribute 
more to their pensions,6 to the significant underfunding of state and 
local public pension funds across the country,7 to the sad spectacle of 
the Detroit municipal bankruptcy where the plight of public pensions 
plays a leading role in that drama.8 The underfunding of public 
pension plans has led not only to a number of bankruptcy 
proceedings, but also to various states reducing promised pension 
payouts to retired plan members or increasing contribution 
requirements for active employees.9
There are also issues surrounding public pensions that 
transcend the level of government involved. For instance, a country-
wide push exists for public plans to adopt consumer-driven, defined 
contribution plans of the 401(k) variety, though such new plans are 
largely limited to new employees.10 Additionally, legislation to offer 
3. See infra Part III.
4. See Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry & Mark Cafarelli, COLA 
Cuts in State/Local Pensions, 38 CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. 2 (2014), available 
at http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/cola-cuts-in-statelocal-pensions/ (finding that seventeen 
states have “reduced, suspended, or eliminated” cost-of-living-adjustments (COLAs) 
for public employee pensions).
5. See Bradford, supra note 1 (“[T]he Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College found most already have taken steps to reduce future pension costs 
by some combination of increasing employee contributions, raising age and tenure 
requirements, trimming salary calculation formulas used to set pension levels and 
shrinking or stopping cost-of-living increases.”).
6. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, H.J. RES. 59, 113th Cong.,
increased the required employee pension contribution for new employees first hired 
after December 2013 to 4.4% of pay. See Kellie Lunney, What the Budget Deal 
Means for Federal Employees, NAT’L J. (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/budget/what-the-budget-deal-means-for-federal-
employees-20131211.
7. Only one-third of American states have put aside sufficient money to 
fund their pensions, and some twenty states have funding levels below 80%, which 
is considered an unhealthy rate. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 2, at 3-4.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See Hazel Bradford, Baltimore Approves Moving New City Employees 
to D.C. or Hybrid Plan, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (May 7, 2014, 3:33 PM),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20140507/ONLINE/140509869/baltimore-
approves-moving-new-city-employees-to-dc-or-hybrid-plan (“Baltimore will offer 
new employees the choice of a defined contribution plan or a hybrid plan under 
reforms approved Monday by the City Council.”); Meaghan Kilroy, Oklahoma 
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public retirement system participation to private-sector workers in a 
number of states11 and through the federal government’s Thrift 
Savings Plan (TSP) has started to take root.12 Needless to say, there 
is much happening in the American public pension world.
Regardless of whether the crisis of the day involves federal, 
state, or local pension plans, not lurking too far in the background is 
an ongoing debate about how the current public pension system must 
be reformed to provide a more secure and cost-effective retirement 
for public employees in the future.13 Implementation of reforms, 
especially ones that either increase the financial burden on 
employees and/or retirees, or diminish the benefits that employees 
and/or retirees will receive, inevitably leads to protracted litigation.14
Indeed, it can be said without embellishment that the various 
Senate Sends Bill to Create DC Plan to Governor, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (May 
27, 2014, 3:51 PM) http://www.pionline.com/article/20140527/ONLINE/1405
29897/oklahoma-senate-sends-bill-to-create-dc-plan-to-governor (stating that “[t]he 
Oklahoma Senate passed a bill last week that would shift some new employees into 
a new defined contribution plan administered by the $8 billion Oklahoma Public 
Employees Retirement System,” and noting the governor is likely to sign it into 
law). Yet, there has not been as much activity as some expected. See Bradford, 
supra note 1 (“CRR [Center for Retirement Research] researchers found that just 
15% of public plan sponsors introduced some form of defined contribution plan after 
2008.”).
11. See Hazel Bradford, States Pushing to Offer Retirement Accounts to 
Private Sector, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (May 12, 2014), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20140512/PRINT/305129971/states-pushing-to-
offer-retirement-accounts-to-private-sector (“Expanding the public retirement 
system to the private sector moved to political reality from abstract concept this 
year, as 16 states either are considering legislation or taking the first steps toward 
implementing new approaches.”); see also id. (“One approach being considered by 
various states is the Secure Choice Pension proposed by NCPERS [National 
Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems]. Modeled after cash balance 
plans, with voluntary contributions to a public/private partnership, it calls for states 
to set up boards and administrators for professionally managed plans with 
diversified portfolios. Participation would be voluntary and benefits would be 
portable.”).
12. On the federal side, Senator Marco Rubio has proposed opening up the 
federal Thrift Savings Plan, a defined contribution plan offered to federal employees 
and to military personnel, to all employees. See Josh Hicks, Rubio, Retirement 
Benefits and a Thrift Savings Plan for all Americans, WASH. POST (May 14, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/05/14/rubio-retirement-
benefits-and-a-thrift-savings-plan-for-all-americans/.
13. And there is no shortage of public pension-reform proposals in the 
United States. “In terms of reform attempts, the National Conference of State 
Legislatures found 29 states saw 166 pension bills introduced in 2014 alone . . . .”
See Bradford, supra note 1.
14. See infra Parts III-IV.
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stakeholders involved in the American public pension funding crisis 
are presently litigating for the future of American public pensions.
This Article focuses on all three levels of American 
government (federal, state, and local) and reviews the current state of 
pension litigation at each level. Although pension litigation does not 
exist as of the writing of this Article at the federal level, there has 
been a large swath of litigation involving state and local pensions 
over the last few years, with diverse outcomes. After discussing the 
federal employee pension system in the United States, the Article 
then considers one state’s (Wisconsin’s) recent experience with 
pension-reform legislation and litigation, and one city’s (Detroit’s)
experience with the municipal bankruptcy process to illustrate 
emerging trends in public pension litigation that are currently playing 
out throughout the United States.
More specifically, the Wisconsin state case study involves 
changes made to one of the healthiest public pension programs in the 
country, the Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS).15 These pension 
reforms were part of the infamous anti-union laws, Act 10 and Act 
32, which were enacted in 2011 by Republican Governor Scott 
Walker.16 The recently completed Wisconsin litigation, Madison 
Teachers, Inc. v. Walker,17 involved a provision that did not permit 
the City of Milwaukee to pay its employees’ pension contribution 
share.18 This case nicely illustrates some of the major constitutional 
arguments being advanced concerning whether such reform 
proposals are consistent with existing employee and retiree pension 
rights.
15. See Robert J. Conlin, Mike Huebsch & Gregory L. Gracz, Study of the 
Wisconsin Retirement System: In Accordance with 2011 Wisconsin Act 32, DEP’T OF 
EMP. TRUST FUNDS 9 (June 30, 2012), available at etf.wi.gov/publications/wrs-
study.pdf (reporting that WRS I “is an efficient and sustainable retirement system,”
which has been nearly fully funded since 2004).
16. See A.B. 11, 2011 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011), available at
http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/acts/10.pdf; A.B. 40, 2011 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Wisc. 2011), available at http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/acts/
32.pdf. For additional information on the enactment of Act 10 and its aftermath, see 
generally Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011, 27
A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 293 (2012).
17. 2014 WI 99, 851 N.W.2d 337.
18. WIS. STAT. § 62.623(1) (2014) (“Beginning on July 1, 2011, in any 
employee retirement system of a 1st class city, . . . employees shall pay all employee 
required contributions for funding benefits under the retirement system. The 
employer may not pay on behalf of an employee any of the employee’s share of the 
required contributions.”).
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The Detroit city case study involves the ongoing (as of the 
writing of this Article) municipal bankruptcy litigation. Many have 
placed the blame for the Detroit bankruptcy on out-of-control legacy 
costs, including costs to fund various local city pension plans.19
Rather than involving litigation in state or federal court, the Detroit 
drama has played out in federal bankruptcy court under Chapter 9 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code.20 As will be discussed, this is a 
very underdeveloped area of the law, and the bankruptcy judge has
had to grapple with many challenging issues involving the interplay 
of the bankruptcy system and state constitutional provisions, which 
protect against the diminishment of pension rights.21 This is a 
particularly interesting area of American public pension law to 
explore from a comparative perspective because it differs greatly 
from how pensions would be treated if, for instance, Canadian 
municipalities found themselves in financial distress.22
After surveying the current state of public pension litigation in 
the federal, state, and local context in the United States, the Article
concludes by suggesting that all public pension plans could benefit 
from being uniformly regulated either through ERISA (for federal 
pension plans) or through adoption of a uniform law (for state and 
local pension plans).23 Following analyses undertaken by other 
public pension commentators,24 but providing an innovative twist to 
19. See, e.g., Richard Summerfield, Legacy Costs Push Communities to the 
Brink, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE MAG. (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.financierworldwide.com/legacy-costs-push-communities-to-the-
brink/#.VGjuO4vF8s0 (“While no two cases are ever the same, one of the most 
common themes running through the majority of insolvent cities and towns is the 
presence of crippling legacy costs.”).
20. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (2012).
21. See David A. Lieb, Detroit Bankruptcy Tests State Pension Protections,
YAHOO! NEWS (July 24, 2013, 3:10 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/detroit-bankruptcy-
tests-state-pension-protections-065517091.html.
22. See John R. Sandrelli & Valerie Cross, American Municipal 
Bankruptcies: The View from Canada, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW
2013, at 385, 387 (Janis P. Sarra ed., 2014) (“Canada’s model paints a more stable 
picture of municipal finance, suggesting America may need to more rigorously and 
closely monitor municipal distress.”).
23. See infra Part V.
24. See Richard E. Mendales, Federalism and Fiduciaries: A New 
Framework for Protecting State Benefit Funds, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 503, 503 (2014) 
(arguing for “a uniform state code . . . that states could adopt to govern both state 
and local benefit plans”); Amy B. Monahan & Renita K. Thukral, Federal 
Regulation of State Pension Plans: The Governmental Plan Exemption Revisited, 28
A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 291, 292, 297-98 (2013) (providing an overview of 
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past proposals, this Article argues for a hybrid approach to the public 
pension crisis in the United States.
First, Congress should remove the governmental plan 
exemption from ERISA for federal government employee pension 
plans. On the other hand, because of significant federalism concerns 
in having the federal government regulate state and local pension 
plans,25 the best option is for states to adopt a rigorously regulated, 
uniform, state-wide public pension plan in place of current state and 
local pension plans. The combination of these two approaches will 
lead to public employees benefitting from better reporting and 
disclosure, fiduciary, funding, vesting, and benefit accrual 
requirements, which in turn will ensure the future security of their 
pensions. At the same time, the federal, state, and local governments 
will benefit by being able to spend more predictable amounts of 
money on pension obligations, thereby substantially reducing their 
pension obligations over time.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Because of the peculiar 
hodgepodge that constitutes the American employer-sponsored 
pension system, Part I seeks to provide a brief overview of the 
difference between public and private-sector occupational pensions 
in the United States, as well as the difference between defined 
benefit and defined contribution pension plans. Having set out those 
distinctions, the next three parts examine the status of litigation at the 
various levels of American government. Part II lays out the pension 
system for federal employees and notes the current lack of litigation.
Part III then considers Wisconsin pension litigation and explores the 
constitutional causes of actions utilized in such cases. Part IV next 
reviews the ongoing Detroit municipal bankruptcy litigation’s impact 
on city employee pensions and appraises the unique characteristics of 
that legal system. Part V concludes by suggesting that current public 
pension litigation is likely to lead to inconsistent results in different 
venues26 and, therefore, advances a proposal to expand ERISA’s
reasons why ERISA has not been expanded to federal, state, and local governmental 
plans).
25. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 24, at 297-98.
26. Not only will public pension litigation results likely be inconsistent 
across federal, state, and local disputes, but as Professor Olivia Mitchell aptly 
observes, it is also unclear “how much can be learned from one state to another”
when it comes to public pension litigation. See Jonathan Miltimore, States Eye MN 
Pension Lawsuit, WATCHDOG (Aug. 24, 2010), http://watchdog.org/6322/states-eye-
mn-pension-lawsuit/ (quoting Olivia S. Mitchell, Director of the Pension Research 
Council at the Wharton School).
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coverage to cover federal employees and to encourage states to adopt 
a uniform, state-wide law on public pensions. This type of two-
prong, federal–state legislative approach will provide the necessary 
legal standards for public pension plans to avoid the problems that 
have been plaguing them over the years and lead to a more secure 
retirement for American public employees at all levels of 
government. 
I. OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PENSION 
SYSTEM
Although the federally enacted Employee Retiree Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)27 governs private-sector employee 
benefits law in the United States, the law does not apply to federal, 
state, or local pensions, which are exempted “governmental plans.”28
Consequently, public employee pension schemes are regulated by the
federal government for federal employees,29 and by state and local 
governments for their employees.30 These public pension funds, 
numbering about 4,000 plans in total and covering some 27 million 
employees,31 represent an extremely important segment of the overall 
American pension market. Indeed, “[s]tate and local defined benefit 
pension funds held $3.05 trillion in assets in fiscal year 2012 . . . . 
State plans held $2.53 trillion and locally administered plans held 
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012). Congress enacted ERISA to protect 
employees’ retirement and welfare benefits. Id. § 1001(b). Section 2 of ERISA 
contains the Findings and Declarations of Policy. Id. § 1001. Specifically, it states,
“It is hereby declared to be the policy of [the Act] to protect . . . the interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . .” Id. § 1001(b).
28. Id. § 1003(b)(1) (“The provisions of this [title] shall not apply to any 
employee benefit plan if—such plan is a governmental plan (as defined in section 
1002(32) . . . .”). In turn, ERISA § 1002(32) reads, “The term ‘governmental plan’
means a plan established or maintained for its employees by the Government of the 
United States, by the government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by 
any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing.” Id. § 1002(32); see also id.
§ 1321(b)(2) (exemption of governmental plans from PBGC insurance scheme); 
I.R.C. §§ 401, 414(d) (2012) (exemption of governmental plans from applicable tax 
code provisions).
29. See infra Part II.
30. State pension plans are discussed infra Part III, and local pension plans 
are discussed infra Part IV.
31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-322, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 
COSTS AND SUSTAINABILITY (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/
589043.pdf.
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$521 billion in assets, including cash and investments.”32 Although 
these plans owe as much as one trillion dollars more in promised 
benefits than what they hold,33 most public pension funds are not in 
danger of defaulting on their pension promises in the near future.34
32. See Hazel Bradford, State and Local Pension Plans Pass $3 Trillion 
Mark in Fiscal Year 2012, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Apr. 29, 2014, 4:22 PM), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20140429/ONLINE/140429829/state-and-local-
pension-plans-pass-3-trillion-mark-in-fiscal-year-2012; see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 31 (finding that “[o]ver 27 million 
[individuals] are covered by state and local government pension plans”).
33. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also William Selway, U.S. 
Public Pension Shortfalls Exceed $1 Trillion, Study Finds, BLOOMBERG BNA
PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (June 10, 2014, 11:32 AM), 
http://news.bna.com/pdln/PDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=48012983&vname=p
bdnotallissues&jd=a0f1n6x7d5&split=0 (citing Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre 
Aubry & Mark Cafarelli, The Funding of State and Local Pensions: 2013-2017, 39
CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. (2014)). However, “[t]he study assumes annual 
investment gains of 7.7 percent to calculate the cost, in today’s dollars, of benefits 
that will be paid out in the coming decades. If that is reduced to 4 percent, the 
shortfall grows to as much as $3.8 trillion.” Selway, supra.
34. See Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions and the Law and 
Politics of Public Pensions, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 6), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436587 (“Despite 
this large deficit, the $1 trillion funding gap does not means [sic] that public plans 
are in imminent danger of being unable to pay benefits.”). But see Terrance 
O’Reilly, A Public Pensions Bailout: Economics & Law, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368045 
(citing studies that in close to half of states public pension plans may become 
insolvent). See also Jack M. Beerman, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 3, 10-16 (2013) (summarizing arguments by both those who believe a public 
pension crisis is imminent and those who think such claims are unfounded and 
largely a conservative ploy to undermine public-sector employee unions). Professor 
Beerman, for his part, concludes, “[W]hile there may be some exaggeration out 
there, the pension funding crisis is real.” Id. at 15. That being said, not everyone 
agrees that there is a pension funding crisis in the United States. Critics have pointed 
to the lack of sharp spikes in state and municipal bonds prices, like the ones seen in 
recent years in Greece, Italy, and Spain, and this suggests that investors are still 
willing to buy the paper of most American states and municipalities (with the State 
of Illinois and the City of Detroit being important exceptions). See John Cummings 
et al., PIMCO’s Outlook on Municipal Bonds, XYPRIA INVESTMENT ADVISORS (Nov. 
6, 2013), http://xpyriainvestment.com/pimcos-outlook-on-municipal-bonds/ (“While 
recent articles in the press have painted the market with a broad brush, the municipal 
market is very diverse and each credit is unique. In the aggregate, the municipal 
bond market is not facing a debt crisis; the average state debt level totals 7.3% of 
gross state product while local debt totals 11% of U.S. GDP. By comparison several 
European peripheral countries have debt-to-GDP ratios above 100%. Interest costs 
and rollover risk do not present a near-term systemic threat to the municipal 
market.”).
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That being said, the significant underfunding of pensions has had a 
major impact on state and local finances.35
As far as state and local government pension plans in the 
United States, these plans initially had many similar attributes as 
private-sector employer-sponsored plans under ERISA.36 Now, 
however, with there being more stringent regulations of private 
pension plans (especially with regard to funding), and a dramatic 
shift to defined contribution plans in the private sector,37 there has 
been significant divergence in pension plan structure, design, and 
governance in the private and public sectors.38 For instance, a 
pension plan subject to ERISA “must design, structure, and fund its 
plan in accordance with federal rules,” whereas public pension plans 
“are largely free to structure their pension plans as they see fit and 
are not subject to any funding requirements other than what state law 
might impose.”39 The lack of strict or predictable funding 
requirements for many of these pension plans is often blamed for the 
significantly underfunded state of many of these plans today.40
As far as not subjecting public plans to the stricter requirements 
of ERISA, it might be that Congress thought it unnecessary to 
legislate fiduciary and disclosure standards for the public plans 
because it saw state and local taxpayers as the primary backstops if 
these public plans failed.41 Federalism concerns also played a 
35. See Monahan, supra note 34 (manuscript at 7) (“The increased funding 
needs caused by plan underfunding is putting significant fiscal pressure on both 
states and cities, and has been recognized as one of the most critical issues in state 
and local finance today.”).
36. See Charles B. Stockdale, Douglas A. McIntyre & Michael B. Sauter, 
The Sixteen States That Are Killing Their Pensions, 24/7 WALL STREET (Mar. 4, 
2011), http://247wallst.com/2011/03/04/the-sixteen-states-that-are-killing-their-
pensions.
37. See William T. Payne & Stephen M. Pincus, The Constitutional 
Limitations of Public Employee Pension Reform Legislation, 19 PUB. LAW. 12, 13 
(2011) (“[D]efined benefit plans still make up the bulk of the retirement plans in the 
public sector.”); COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW:
POLICY AND PRACTICE 121-22 (3d ed. 2011) (chart showing that in 2007 in the 
private sector there were 48,982 DB plans and 658,805 DC plans and that there were 
more than three times as many DC plan participants than DB plan ones).
38. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 24, at 291-92.
39. Id. at 292.
40. See Monahan, supra note 34 (manuscript at 7-11) (setting out the 
mechanics of public pension funding); see also id. (manuscript at 11-13) (describing 
“politicians’ inclination to underfund” public pensions).
41. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 24, at 297 (“Congress believed 
‘the ability of the governmental entities to fulfill their obligations to employees 
1364 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1353
dispositive role as far as Congress not trying to assume power over 
public plans.42 Later, numerous bills were introduced to provide for 
federal regulation of public pension plans, but all were defeated on 
federalism grounds.43
As far as the structural issues, federal, state, and local workers 
have much broader access to defined benefit plans than defined 
contribution pension plans.44 This difference in pension plan 
structure is crucial. In defined benefit (DB) plans, “the burden is 
placed on the employer to contribute funds to the pension plan on an 
actuarially-sound basis so that sufficient funds exist to pay the 
worker when [he or] she retires.”45 The employer invests funds on a 
periodic basis on behalf of its employees so that the individual is 
entitled at retirement to a guaranteed payment (in a lump sum or 
annuity form) based on some set payment formula related to years of 
through their taxing power’ eliminated much of the need to regulate how pension 
plans were funded.”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 81 (1973)).
42. See O’Reilly, supra note 34 (manuscript at 16) (“This sort of [federal] 
oversight has been consistently and vigorously opposed by state and local officials 
on the grounds that it ‘run[s] counter to a fundamental principle of American 
federalism, namely, that the states ought to be free to formulate their own employee 
compensation policies without being restrained by federal government regulations or 
mandates.’” (quoting Abraham D. Beame, Preface to ADVISORY COMMISSION ON 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A-71, STATE AND LOCAL PENSION SYSTEMS:
FEDERAL REGULATORY ISSUES (1980), available at
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015081358460;view=1up;seq=)).
43. Id. (“[N]one of the bills proposed in the wake of ERISA, whether styled 
as PERISA [Public Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1982] or the 
Public Employees Pension Plan Reporting and Accountability Act of 1984 
(PEPPRA), was enacted.” (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 101-P, PUBLIC PENSION 
PLANS: THE ISSUES RAISED OVER CONTROL OF PLAN ASSETS (1990), available at
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000016128316;view=1up;seq=1)
(paraphrased material)).
44. Whereas 87% of state government workers and 83% of local workers 
had access to participate in defined benefit pension plans, only 43% of state workers 
and 24% of local workers had access to defined contribution plans. See U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, State and Local Government Employee Benefits, March 2010,
ECON. DAILY (Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/
ted_20110309.htm. Common examples of defined contribution plans in the public 
sector include § 403(b) plans (for educational and other non-profit organizations) 
and § 457 plans (for state and local government employees). See MEDILL, supra note
37, at 104.
45. See Paul M. Secunda, The Forgotten Employee Benefit Crisis: 
Multiemployer Benefit Plans on the Brink, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 84
(2011).
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service and salary history.46 Some of these DB plans are backed by 
government insurance schemes in case of company insolvency. In 
the United States, for example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) undertakes this role by providing government 
insurance for terminated private-sector DB plans.47
On the other hand, defined contribution (DC) plans place all of 
the respective risk (i.e., risk of longevity, risk of investment return, 
and risk of inflation) on the employee.48 In a typical 401(k), 403(b), 
or 457 plan,49 the employer provides a suitable menu of investment 
options to the employee and then may or may not match whatever 
salary contribution the employee makes to their individual pension 
account.50 After that contribution, the employer is completely off the 
hook; they have no additional pension funding responsibilities.51
Whether an employee has sufficient funds for retirement under a DC 
plan depends greatly on the investment return the employee receives 
on the funds in her individual pension account and whether 
employees prematurely remove funds from their accounts, many 
times incurring significant tax penalties, prior to retirement age.52
Consumer-driven retirement investment devices, such as DC 
plans, have the advantages of portability, permitting employees to 
have more control over their pensions, and the option to elect a lump 
sum distribution, as opposed to an annuity.53 The disadvantage of 
placing the onus of retirement security on employees, however, is 
46. JEFFREY M. HIRSCH, PAUL M. SECUNDA & RICHARD A. BALES,
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 198-99 (2d ed. 2013).
47. The PBGC is established under Title IV of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1311 (2012); see Mark Daniels, 
Pensions in Peril: Single Employer Pension Plan Terminations in the Context of 
Corporate Bankruptcies, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 25, 32 (1991) (providing analysis and 
critique of treatment of pension plan obligations during corporate bankruptcies).
48. See generally Paul M. Secunda, 401K Follies: A Proposal to 
Reinvigorate the United States Annuity Market, 30 A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION 
NEWSQUARTERLY 13, 13-14 (Fall 2010).
49. See HIRSCH, SECUNDA & BALES, supra note 46, at 199-200 (explaining 
different forms of defined contribution plans).
50. See id.
51. See Payne & Pincus, supra note 37, at 13 (“Underfunding is never an 
issue with 401(k) plans because the retiree receives only what has been contributed 
and any investment returns. The risk is squarely on the worker if his or her 
investment choices do not perform up to expectations.”).
52. HIRSCH, SECUNDA & BALES, supra note 46, at 199.
53. Secunda, supra note 48, at 14. But see generally Steven L. Willborn, 
The Problem with Pension Portability, 77 NEB. L. REV. 344 (1998) (discussing 
potential costs that could be distributed among employees and workers with added 
pension portability).
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that they may be financially illiterate, apathetic, or just not have the 
money to put away in retirement given other life exigencies like first 
homes, student loans, and unpredictable medical expenses.54
Additionally, DC plans are not backed by government insurance 
schemes, like under the PBGC.55 Although some movement exists in 
the public sector towards adopting DC plans,56 for now the DC plan 
dilemma primarily afflicts the private-sector pension world.
Public pension plans, whether for federal, state, or local 
employees, also look significantly different in design and operation 
from private-sector pension plans under ERISA. For instance, with 
regard to state and local pension plans, little federal oversight exists, 
and much discretion is left to individual state and local 
jurisdictions.57 Important differences also exist in the budgeting 
54. See Secunda, supra note 48, at 13 (“[N]o guarantee exists that a 
participant will receive any specified amount of benefit at retirement and many baby 
boomers are waking up to this strange new world of being in charge of their future 
retirement.”). 401(k) fees are also a serious concern for participants, and one recent, 
prominent study has illustrated how the fees in numerous 401(k) plans are so high 
that they negate the tax advantages of having such a retirement plan in the first 
place. See generally Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The 
Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2399531.
55. See HIRSCH, SECUNDA & BALES, supra note 46, at 199.
56. See Bradford, supra note 10 (newly hired workers in Baltimore can 
choose to contribute 5% of their salary either to a hybrid DB plan or to a DC plan);
see also PAULA SANFORD & JOSHUA M. FRANZEL, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PLANS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 6 (2012), available at
http://www.slge.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/The-Evolving-Role-of-Defined-
Contribution-Plans.pdf (“Many public officials are concerned with the long-term 
costs of their current defined benefit programs and will continue to redesign these 
plans and consider alternative retirement arrangements. However, most of the 
changes implemented to date, including switching to hybrid and core defined 
contribution plans, usually affect new employees.”). Still other states, like Kentucky, 
have adopted cash balance plans for their state retirement plans, which are a type of 
DB plan that seeks to make funding costs more predictable going forward. See PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PUBLIC PENSION CASH BALANCE PLANS: A PRIMER 3-5 (2014),
available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2014/Cash
Balance-Brief_v7.pdf.
57. For instance, many states do not require their public-sector plans to pre-
fund at any given level, like ERISA does. This state of affairs has led many state and 
local pension plans to be significantly underfunded. See Payne & Pincus, supra note 
37, at 13. Of course, pension plans for federal employees are regulated by the 
federal government, but interestingly not to the same extent as DB private-sector 
plans under ERISA when it comes to funding. See discussion infra Section II.A.
Litigating for the Future of Public Pensions 1367
process and the applicable accounting standards.58 Design issues for 
public pension vary because the focus is on public-sector-specific 
issues such as: (1) the need to make up for the lack of Social Security 
participation and coverage for some public employees;59 (2) the issue 
of whether there should be tax deductible employee contributions;60
and (3) the need to address earlier mandatory retirement ages for 
police and firefighters.61 Finally, public plans require a higher degree 
of public transparency because of the governmental decision making
involved.62
Differences in structure, design, and operation between 
American public- and private-sector pension plans mean that unique 
issues must be considered in the public context that either do not 
apply in the private sector or apply less often.63 Additionally, because 
the government is acting in an employment capacity when it deals 
with public pensions, every time that the state employer seeks to 
modify or amend the pension structure for employee pensions, a host 
58. See Mendales, supra note 24, at 505-08; see also Bradford, supra note 1
(“One new wrinkle in 2014 that could dampen recent improvements is 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board rules that will, for the first time, add 
another number to the political equation: net pension liability. . . . Adding a system’s
total unfunded liability, instead of just the current amount due, to its financial 
reports will make an underfunded plan look worse, and even a relatively well-
funded one look less so.”).
59. See CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T EXCELLENCE, STATE AND LOCAL 
PENSIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF FUNDING ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 5 (2011), available
at https://transformgov.org/Documents/Document/Document/302480 (“All private 
sector employees participate in Social Security, while 30 percent of state and local 
employees do not.”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-248T,
SOCIAL SECURITY: ISSUES REGARDING THE COVERAGE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 3
(2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08248t.pdf (statement of 
Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Director of Education, Workforce, and Income Security) 
(observing that about one out of every four employees covered by public pension 
plans receive no benefits under the Social Security system because their employers 
have opted out of it).
60. See PUB. PLANS PRACTICES TASK FORCE OF THE AM. ACAD. OF 
ACTUARIES, RISK MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC PLAN RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 3 (2010), 
available at http://actuary.org/pdf/pension/PPPTF_Final_Report_c pdf.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See Mendales, supra note 24, at 508 (“Many of the key issues that need 
to be addressed, including adequate public funding, protecting state credit, and 
states’ ability to offer attractive benefit packages to their employees, differ from 
those addressed by ERISA, which is designed primarily to protect individual 
beneficiaries of privately sponsored benefit plans.”).
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of constitutional concerns must be considered.64 Indeed, although 
many see ERISA as providing more stringent regulation of private-
sector pensions than state public pension laws do with regard to 
public plans, it is actually easier to amend private plans than public 
plans. This is because although ERISA “protects accrued benefits . . . 
it allows employers to change the terms going forward. In contrast, 
most states have legal provisions that constrain sponsors’ ability to 
make changes to future benefits for current workers.”65
For instance, under both a federal and state constitutional 
contract clause claim,66 plaintiff employees or retirees may obtain 
injunctive relief to enjoin the contemplated pension reform, with 
regard to cuts on both already-earned pension benefits and future 
rates of benefit accrual.67 Moreover, for a number of states that see 
pension rights as property rights, the Due Process and Takings 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal 
Constitution may also provide some protection for interference with 
public pension rights, though that protection may be minimal.68
64. These constitutional considerations are absent when private employers 
seek to amend, modify, or terminate their pension benefits because there is a lack of 
state action. See George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2008) (“All the . . . provisions of the 
Constitution regulate the structure and function of government, and if they confer 
individual rights, they protect only against ‘state action,’ in the broad sense of action 
by the federal government as well as by the states.”).
65. Munnell, Aubry & Cafarelli, supra note 4, at 1; see also Amy B.
Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and Its Impact on Public 
Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1032 (2012) (“The practical result of this 
rule is that pension benefits for current employees cannot be detrimentally changed, 
even if the changes are purely prospective. Thus, the only readily available option 
for changing employee pension benefits in these states is to limit such changes to 
new hires.”).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. State constitutional impairment of 
contract provisions are identical to the federal one and are subject to the same legal 
analysis. See Monahan, supra note 65, at 1040.
67. See Monahan, supra note 65, at 1032.
68. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n of Omaha,
Local 385 v. City of Omaha, No. 8:10-CV-19, 2010 WL 2426446, at *1, *5 (D. 
Neb. June 10, 2010) (finding that cutting pension benefits can constitute an 
abridgement of a property right). Although a number of states have found that 
pensions constitute a property right, such characterizations do not necessarily 
provide much protection for pension participants. See Amy B. Monahan, Public 
Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617, 637 (2010)
(“Construing a participant’s right to pension benefits as a property right potentially 
provides too little protection for participants in public pension plans.”); T. Leigh 
Anenson, Alex Slabaugh & Karen Eilers Lahey, Reforming Public Pensions, 33 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 19) (“[W]hile legislatures 
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Additionally, under state constitutional home rule amendments, state 
government may be limited in dictating how local government 
officials operate their local pension plans.69 Finally, at least at the 
local level, bankruptcy proceedings may also come into play if a 
municipality is permitted to seek protection from its creditors under 
the Bankruptcy Code.70
In all, a whole different litany of considerations apply when 
considering public pension-reform options, as well as litigation 
theories that might be successful in counteracting pension-reform 
proposals. The next three Parts, discussing federal, state, and local 
pension design and litigation in more detail, show just exactly how 
different and varied public pension litigation can look from one level 
of American government to the next. Such findings also suggest that 
any solution to this haphazard public pension world must begin with 
steps to harmonize the discordant aspects of these systems so greater 
predictability, consistency, and uniformity can be fostered going 
forward.
II. THE FEDERAL PENSION SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
CURRENT ABSENCE OF LITIGATION
Civilian federal employees take part in a complex retirement 
system that features two distinct DB plans, one DC plan, and Social 
Security benefits.71 In light of significant funding issues, Congress 
has recently enacted new legislation that has dramatically increased 
the level of contributions that some federal employees are required to 
make to the pension trust fund.72
in property states [including Connecticut and Maine] do not have an unfettered 
power of revocation, employees not yet retired or eligible for retirement are 
protected against purely arbitrary revisions.”); see also infra Section III.C 
(discussing the failure of the due process argument in Wisconsin public pension 
litigation).
69. See infra Section III.A.
70. See infra Part IV.
71. See KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-810, FEDERAL 
EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM: BENEFITS AND FINANCING 1-2 (2014).
72. See Alan Fram, Congress Targets Fed Workers’ Pensions for Savings,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 16, 2013, 1:08 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/federal-
workers-pensions-targeted-budget-deal.
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A. Federally Sponsored Pension Plans
Federal employees and members of the uniformed services 
receive pension benefits through either the Civil Service Retirement 
Service (CSRS), established by the Civil Service Retirement Act of 
1920 (CSRA),73 or the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act 
of 1986 (FERS), a law modeled after ERISA.74 Federal employees 
who were hired after 1984, and employees who voluntarily switched 
from CSRS, also participate in the FERS.75 Employees covered by 
the FERS also receive Social Security Benefits and have the option 
to participate in the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP).76 The TSP is 
administered by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board and
is a well-run DC plan that “offers its participants the same type of 
savings and tax benefits that are offered under private-sector 401(k) 
plans.”77
Employees who participate in the CSRS plan are generally not 
entitled to Social Security Benefits, and while these employees may 
be able to participate in the TSP, they are not eligible to receive a 
matching contribution from their employing agency.78 FERS
employees eligible to participate in TSP “can deposit up to a 
maximum of $17,500 in 2014” to their accounts with their 
employing agency matching up to 5% of pay.79
73. Civil Service Retirement Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-215, 41 Stat. 614.
74. Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
335, 100 Stat. 514 (codified primarily at 5 U.S.C. § 8351 and §§ 8401-8479).
75. See Nielsen v. Dep’t of the Interior, 198 F. App’x. 953, 954-55 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006).
76. ISAACS, supra note 71, at 1.
77. See Statement of Greg Long, Executive Director, Federal Retirement 
Thrift Investment Board, before Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and 
Pension Benefit Plans, Employee Benefits Security Administration (Aug. 21, 2014), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/AClong082114.pdf (“Individual accounts 
are maintained for more than 4.6 million Federal and Postal employees, members of 
the uniformed services, retirees, and spousal beneficiaries. As of May 31, 2014, the 
TSP held approximately $412.5 billion in retirement savings.”); KATELIN P. ISAACS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30631, RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR MEMBERS OF 
CONGRESS 3, 7 (2014); Hicks, supra note 12 (“Financial experts cite the TSP as a 
model for 401(k) plans because of its simplicity, low fees and diverse investment 
options, among other benefits.”).
78. See Tammy Flanagan, CSRS vs. FERS, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Mar. 31, 
2006), http://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/retirement-planning/2006/03/csrs-vs-
fers/21480/; see also ISAACS, supra note 71, at 1.
79. ISAACS, supra note 77, at 3.
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B. Changes to Employee Contributions to Federal Pensions
Participants of both CSRS and FERS plans contribute a 
percentage of their income to the Civil Service Retirement and 
Disability Fund (CSRDF), the civil service trust fund.80 The CSRDF 
is a communal trust fund from which the defined benefits of both the 
CSRS and the FERS systems are invested and eventually paid out.81
In September 2011, CSRDF had an unfunded actuarial liability of 
$761.5 billion, of which $741.4 billion was attributable to CSRS and 
$20.1 billion was attributable to FERS.82
In large part, this liability can be attributed to a major flaw in 
the design of the CSRS. In designing this plan, Congress failed to 
take into account future employee pay raises and cost-of-living 
adjustments (COLAs), which then required the federal government 
to contribute additional funds to cover the shortfall.83 Moreover, 
while private employers are required to pre-fund their DB plans 
under ERISA,84 the federal government was not required to pre-fund 
its pension liability.85 In light of this significant unfunded liability,
Congress acted to increase the funding to the CSRDF.
80. See Ralph Smith, How Much Do You Know About Funding of the 
Federal Retirement System?, FEDSMITH (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.fedsmith.com/
2012/11/14/how-much-do-you-know-about-funding-of-the-federal-retirement-
system.
81. See id.; see also KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30023,
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM: BUDGET AND TRUST FUND ISSUES 1
(2014).
82. ISAACS, supra note 71, at 13.
83. See Stephen Losey, Federal Pension Systems’ Unfunded Liabilities 
Skyrocket, FED. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2013, 8:47 AM), http://www.federaltimes.com/
article/20130220/BENEFITS02/302200001/Federal-pension-systems-8217-
unfunded-liabilities-skyrocket (“Much of the multibillion-dollar deficit in the 
government’s pension fund is left over from a major flaw when Congress designed 
the generous CSRS pension. All of CSRS’s future costs were not covered by the 
combination of agencies’ contributions and employee’s contributions, which amount 
to 14 percent of payroll.”).
84. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1085 (2012) (minimum funding rules).
85. See Dennis Cauchon, Federal Retirement Plans Almost as Costly as 
Social Security, USA TODAY (Sept. 29, 2011, 6:21 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-10-11/federal-
retirement-pension-benefits/50592474/1 (“Private employers are legally required to 
put money into pension funds to match retirement promises. Private pensions have 
$2.3 trillion in stocks, bonds, real estate and other assets. State and local 
governments have $3 trillion in retirement funds. The federal government has 
nothing set aside.”).
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In December 2013, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act 
of 2013.86 This Act increased the required employee contribution for 
new employees first hired (or rehired with less than five years of 
service) after December 2013 to 4.4% of pay.87 This increase did not 
affect employees first hired before 2013, who contribute 0.8% of pay 
to the CSRDF, or employees first hired in 2013, who contribute 
3.1% of pay to the CSRDF.88 This agreement was viewed as “a
partial victory for federal employee unions and Democrat[s]” who 
had feared that current workers would be faced with increased 
pension contributions under the new budget deal with Republicans.89
More recently, the House, based on Republican support only, 
passed a non-binding FY2015 budget resolution that would call for 
even greater increases in employee contributions to federal 
pensions.90 Under this resolution, new federal workers would be 
placed in a DC plan, and current federal and congressional 
employees would be required to increase their contributions to the 
CSRDF.91 The Senate, however, is not expected to take up this 
resolution.92
C. Other Recently Proposed Public Pension Reforms
In the 113th Congress (2013–2014), several other pieces of 
legislation have been introduced that propose significant changes to 
federal retirement benefits and financing. Two of these bills propose 
significant reforms to the federal retirement system.
86. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-67, 127 Stat. 1165.
87. See Lunney, supra note 6.
88. See ISAACS, supra note 71, at 10; see also Associated Press, Federal 
Workers’ Pensions Targeted in Budget Deal, POLITICO (Dec. 16, 2013, 6:20 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/budget-deal-federal-workers-pensions-
101186.html.
89. See Sean Reilly, Pension Costs for New Feds Would Increase Under 
Budget Deal, FED. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20131210/CONGRESS/312100011/Pension-
costs-new-feds-would-increase-under-budget-deal.
90. Louis C. LaBrecque, House OKs Budget Plan that Would Increase 
Retirement Contributions by Federal Workers, BLOOMBERG BNA PENSION &
BENEFITS DAILY (Apr. 10, 2014), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/search/results/5816c30ab2535ae40a42f893e40c52e
9/document/XD98AFO4000000?search32=DPNLUQBDE1FN0Q3IC5PMASPT64.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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First, the Sequester Replacement and Spending Reduction Act 
of 201393 proposes to increase employee contributions to CSRS and 
FERS over the course of three years for a cumulative increase of 
2.3%.94 Second, the Public-Private Employee Retirement Parity Act95
would end coverage under the FERS for prospective employees and 
convert these employees to Social Security and TSP benefits.96
Third, and finally, the Provide for the Common Defense Act of 
201397 proposed significant changes to federal retirement programs, 
including an increase in employee contributions to the CSRS and 
FERS by 1.2% over three years and the implementation of a new 
method of calculating COLAs for beneficiaries of CSRS and FERS.98
D. The Lack of Federal Pension Litigation
As of the writing of this Article, there has not been any 
litigation resulting from any recent federal employee pension reform.
This is hardly surprising, given that the only recent changes to the 
federal pension system have required newly hired employees in 2013 
and 2014 to pay additional contributions to CSRDF. These reforms 
do not impact current employees, and thus, a lack of interference 
with current pension benefits best explains the lack of litigation.
On the other hand, if Congress enacts any of the proposals 
discussed above which require current federal employees to 
contribute more to the federal pension trust, it would be more likely 
there would be litigation involving constitutional impairment of 
contract claims, much like the claims discussed in the next Part. But 
for the time being, all is quiet on the federal employee pension 
litigation front.
93. S. 18, 113th Cong. (2013).
94. ISAACS, supra note 71, at 17.
95. S. 1678, 113th Cong. (2013).
96. See Ian Smith, Senators Propose to End Defined Benefit Pensions for 
New Federal Employees, FEDSMITH (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.fedsmith.com/
2013/11/13/senators-propose-to-end-pensions-for-new-federal-employees; see also 
Stephen Losey, Obama Budget Proposes Hike in Pension Contributions for Feds,
FED. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2013, 12:44 PM), http://www.federaltimes.com/article/
20130410/BENEFITS02/304100004/Obama-budget-proposes-hike-pension-
contributions-feds.
97. H.R. 3639, 113th Cong. (2013).
98. Eric Katz, GOP Lawmakers: Cut Fed Benefits, Not Defense Spending,
GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.govexec.com/management/2013/12/
gop-lawmakers-cut-fed-benefits-not-defense-spending/74807; see also ISAACS,
supra note 71, at 18.
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III. STATE AND LOCAL PENSION LITIGATION CASE STUDY:
THE BATTLE OVER INCREASING PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS IN 
WISCONSIN
The value of many public pension funds decreased dramatically 
during the global recession of 2008.99 Although securities have 
rebounded to a large extent since that time,100 the losses suffered then 
are still being felt now. Indeed, many estimates suggest that public 
pension funds in the United States are still running at a deficit similar 
to the deficit that existed during the beginning of the global recession 
over five years ago.101 The problem is no longer the recession, but the 
fact that politicians continue, maddeningly, to choose not to fund 
pubic pensions as they are required to do under state law (even 
sometimes under state constitutional law).102
To put the extent of the public pension underfunding issue in 
some perspective, consider that private-sector DB pension plans 
under ERISA are subject to certain minimum funding rules to keep 
99. See Stockdale, McIntyre & Sauter, supra note 36 (“During a period like 
the market collapse of 2008, the value of many large pension funds plunged.”).
100. See Bradford, supra note 1 (“Wilshire Consulting . . . found the 
aggregate funding ratio of 134 state defined benefit plans reached 75% in the fiscal 
year ended June 30, thanks largely to strong global equity markets that saw pension 
fund assets growing faster than liabilities.”).
101. See Carl A. Hess, Thomas J. Healey & Kevin Nicholson, Public 
Pension Reform: Benefit Design as the Key to Sustainability, PUB. SECTOR INC. (Jan. 
7, 2014), http://www.publicsectorinc.org/2014/01/public-pension-reform-benefit-
design-as-the-key-to-sustainability/ (“[E]stimates of the nationwide public pension 
deficit range from $730 billion to $4.4 trillion . . . .”); Selway, supra note 33
(finding that as of June 2014, “U.S. state and local government pensions have at 
least $1.1 trillion less than they need for promised retirement benefits, even after 
stock-market gains and increased contributions boosted the funds”).
102. See Monahan, supra note 34 (manuscript at 4) (“For a politician, it may 
be unwise to spend scarce budgetary dollars on a pension plan contribution, which 
will help provide benefits decades in the future, compared to spending those 
budgetary dollars on something that provides immediate returns to the constituents 
that the politician relies upon to be reelected.”). For a recent example of this failure 
to fund current public pension obligations, see Michael Symons, Gov. Christie Cuts 
N.J. Pension Payments, USA TODAY (May 20, 2014, 2:59 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/20/chris-christie-new-jersey-
pension-payments/9333971/ (“Gov. Chris Christie is slashing the contributions 
scheduled to be made to New Jersey public workers’ pension funds by nearly $2.5 
billion over the next 14 months to deal with a revenue shortfall facing the state 
budget.”).
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them from becoming too underfunded.103 ERISA considers private-
sector DB plans healthy, or least not “at risk,” if they are at least 
80% funded.104 Under 80% funding, “no benefit increases may be 
granted, and any lump sum benefits are limited to 50% of the value 
of a retiring employee’s pension benefit. Under 60% funding, the 
plan must freeze benefit accruals, and all lump sum payouts are 
prohibited.”105 Using these pension funding benchmarks, many state 
and local pension plans would be considered significantly at-risk 
based on the extent of their current level of underfunding.106 This is 
hardly surprising given how commonplace it has become that states 
and localities do not contribute to their pension plans as required on 
a timely basis.107 
The current underfunded status of many state public pension 
plans has caused the predictable finger-pointing concerning the 
seemingly generous employee benefits public employees receive 
(though a number of studies show that public employees do not 
receive lavish pensions and other employee–retiree benefits as some 
critics charge).108 In the meantime, almost all state legislatures have 
103. See Charles J. Ford, Mark M. Glickman & Charles A. Jeszeck, 
Weaknesses in Defined Benefit Pension Funding Rules: A Look at the Largest Plans, 
1995-2002, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 351, 356 (2006).
104. See I.R.C. § 436 (2012).
105. See Ilana Boivie, Research Economist, Commc’n Workers of Am.,
Testimony to the U.S. Department of Labor’s Advisory Council on Employee
Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans at the Meeting on Private Sector Pension De-
risking and Participant Protections 4 (June 5, 2013), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/CWA060513.pdf.
106. Twenty states have funding levels below 80%. See PEW CTR. ON THE 
STATES, supra note 2, at 4; see also Andrew Bary, State of the States, BARRON’S
(Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://online.barrons.com/news/articles/SB500014240531119048814045776033015
66976464?mod=BOL_archive_twm_ls#articleTabs_article%3D1 (“[A] study by the 
Center for Retirement Research of Boston College found that 126 state and local 
plans were only 75% funded as of June 2011.”).
107. Andrew Bary, Munis on the Mend, BARRON’S (Oct. 14, 2013),
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB500014240531119038915045791218022221183
32.html#articleTabs_article%3D1 (“What separates most states with strong pension 
funding from those with deep deficits is a willingness to fund their plans 
consistently at the actuarially required contribution level.”).
108. Compare Jeffrey H. Keefe, Are Wisconsin Public Employees Over-
Compensated?, ECON. POL’Y INST. BRIEFING PAPER #290 (Feb. 10, 2011), available 
at http://epi.3cdn.net/9e237c56096a8e4904_rkm6b9hn1.pdf (finding public sector 
workers in Wisconsin are not overpaid), and ALICIA H. MUNNELL, STATE AND LOCAL 
PENSIONS: WHAT NOW? 140 (2012) (“[P]ension and retiree health benefits for state 
and local workers roughly offset the wage penalty, so that, taken as a whole, 
compensation in the two sectors is roughly comparable.”), with John O. McGinnis & 
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implemented different pension-reform options to counteract pension 
underfunding.109 For instance, no fewer than seventeen states have 
passed legislation that has either reduced or eliminated the COLA for 
retirees currently receiving public pensions.110 Because such 
legislation significantly diminishes the amount of retirement benefits 
these individuals will receive, much COLA litigation has ensued, 
with the retirees largely being unsuccessful in invalidating these 
reforms.111
On the other hand, municipal employees had at least initial 
success in pushing back against non-COLA pension reforms 
instituted in Wisconsin in 2011.112 Although Wisconsin maintains 
one of the healthiest state pension plans in the country, the 2011 
pension reforms required most public employees to contribute to 
their pensions for the first time.113 The effect of this provision on the 
Max Schanzenbach, The Case Against Public Sector Unions, POL’Y REV., Aug. 1, 
2010, at 1, available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-
review/article/43266 (arguing that public-sector employees, especially union-
represented public-sector employees, are paid higher wages than their private-sector 
counterparts).
109. See Miller, supra note 1 (“Since the financial crash of 2008-2009, 45 
states have changed their pension plans, a new study by the National Association of 
State Retirement Administrators (NASRA) and the Center for State & Local 
Government Excellence (SLGE) reports.”).
110. See Munnell, Aubry & Cafarelli, supra note 4, at 2.
111. See id. at 4 (“Of the 17 states that changed their COLA, 12 have been 
challenged in court.”). Of those twelve challenges, courts have ruled in favor of the 
government in eight states, and only one group of plaintiffs (Washington) has been 
successful. Id. at 4-5.
112. See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 2012-AP-2067, 2013 WL 
1760805, at *1, *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2013) (stating that the trial court upheld 
Contract clause and Home Rule clause challenges to Wisconsin pension contribution 
changes).
113. For instance, a recent report on the financial health of the Wisconsin 
Retirement System concluded that “Wisconsin’s pension system is on excellent 
financial footing and among the healthiest in the nation, according to multiple 
independent reports and an analysis by COWS [Center on Wisconsin Strategy] and 
CEPR [Center for Economic and Policy Research].” See CTR. ON WIS. STRATEGY,
THE WISCONSIN RETIREMENT SYSTEM IS ONE OF THE HEALTHIEST IN THE COUNTRY
(2011), available at http://www.cows.org/the-wisconsin-retirement-system-is-one-
of-the-healthiest-in-the-country. It appears that requiring pension contributions was 
part of a larger political battle over the future of public-sector collective bargaining 
rights and reducing the size of the budget deficit. See Secunda, supra note 16, at 
296-97. The pension contribution increase measure can be viewed at the very least 
as an easy way for the then-new Republican Governor Scott Walker to cut 
government operating expenses through a government-wide, disguised pay cut. See
CTR. ON WIS. STRATEGY, supra.
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pension rights of Milwaukee city employees was dramatic. For 
instance, “[a] contribution [requirement] of 5.5 percent of an 
employee’s pay would be equivalent to 114.4 hours of pay . . . [or] 
equivalent to loss of 14.3 days of pay, assuming an eight-hour 
day.”114
Public laborers in the City of Milwaukee responded to these 
reforms in Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker115 by seeking to 
invalidate the pension-reform measure under § 62.623116 on three 
grounds: (1) the City of Milwaukee’s home rule authority;117 (2) the 
contract clause of the Wisconsin Constitution;118 and (3) the due 
process clause of the Wisconsin Constitution.119 The treatment of 
these legal claims by the Wisconsin trial court will be analyzed to 
understand the nature of these claims and their viability outside of 
Wisconsin (though these claims ended up failing in Wisconsin 
itself).
A. Home Rule Amendment
The plaintiffs argued that the violation of the Wisconsin 
Constitution’s Home Rule Amendment stems from the fact that the 
pension-reform provision (§ 62.623) requires a 5.5% salary 
contribution from Milwaukee employees120 to the Milwaukee 
114. See, e.g., Letter from Grant F. Langley, City of Milwaukee Attorney, to 
Alderman Joseph A. Dudzik 11 (Feb. 28, 2011), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/langleyletter.pdf.
115. 2014 WI 99, 851 N.W.2d 337.
116. WIS. STAT. § 62.623 (2014) (enacted under 2011 Wisconsin Acts 10 and 
32).
117. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3(1).
118. Id. art. I, § 12.
119. Id. art. I, § 1.
120. That section states in pertinent part:
62.623 Payment of contributions in an employee retirement system of a 
1st class city. Beginning on the effective date of this section . . . , in any 
employee retirement system of a 1st class city, . . . employees shall pay all 
employee required contributions for funding benefits under the retirement 
system. The employer may not pay on behalf of an employee any of the 
employee’s share of the required contributions.
A.B. 11, 2011 Leg., Spec. Sess. § 167.62.623 (Wis. 2011). Section 62.623 only 
applies to Wisconsin municipal employees in cities of the first class, which only 
includes Milwaukee. See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 2012-AP-2067,
2013 WL 1760805, at *8 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2013). However, similar 
provisions exist for other cities and villages in Wisconsin, as well as for state 
employees. See id. at *1 (“This appeal involves municipal employees, but the 
statutory provisions at issue here have direct counterparts in a separate statutory 
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Employee Retirement System (Milwaukee ERS) and forbids the city 
from agreeing to make that pension contribution on the employee’s
behalf.121 This provision was thought to directly conflict with § 36-
08-07-a-l of the City of Milwaukee’s Charter Ordinances.122 That 
Charter Ordinance provision requires the city to make the 
employee’s share of pension contributions for those employees hired 
before January 1, 2010.123 The legal question thus came down to 
whether the state pension-reform provision could supplant 
Milwaukee’s Charter Ordinance.124
Although it might seem obvious that a state legislative 
enactment should supersede a contrary local ordinance, such 
conflicts are analyzed under the Home Rule Amendment. That 
amendment gives municipalities the right to “determine their local 
affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to such 
enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity 
shall affect every city or . . . village.”125 Courts have interpreted this 
language to mean that state legislation concerning local affairs is 
only permitted as long as the legislation affects every city and village 
in Wisconsin uniformly.126 The issue is whether the legislation is 
about local affairs or state-wide concerns. If the former, the state 
cannot legislate in that area; if the latter, the legislation is valid.127 In 
making this distinction, the term “local affairs” is subject to liberal 
interpretation, but the legislature’s determination that a matter is of 
“state-wide concern” is afforded great weight.128
The plaintiffs argued that the Charter ordinance concerning 
pension contributions was a matter of local concern.129 In support of 
subchapter that applies to state employees. Thus, a decision on the provisions 
affecting municipal employees would appear to be dispositive with respect to state 
employees.”).
121. Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11-CV-3774, 2012 WL 
4041495, at *9 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Sept. 14, 2012), rev’d, 2014 WI 99, 851 N.W.2d 337.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. at *11.
125. WIS CONST. art. XI, § 3(1). “The Home Rule Amendment is a 
constitutional limitation on the power of the Legislature. It both directly grants 
legislative power to municipalities and limits the legislature’s exercise of its 
legislative power.” Madison Teachers, Inc., 2012 WL 4041495, at *9 (citing State 
ex rel. Michalek v. LeGrand, 253 N.W.2d 505, 506-07 (Wis. 1977)).
126. See Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 267 N.W. 25, 34 (Wis. 1936).
127. Madison Teachers, Inc., 2012 WL 4041495, at *9.
128. Id. (citing Van Gilder, 267 N.W. at 30-31).
129. Id.
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this argument, they cited to a 1947 provision in the Milwaukee ERS,
which states:
“For the purpose of giving to cities of the first class the largest measure of 
self-government with respect to pension annuity and retirement systems 
compatible with the constitution and general law, it is hereby declared to 
be the legislative policy that all future amendments and alterations to this 
act are matters of local affair and government and shall not be construed 
as an enactment of statewide concern.”130
Because the state pension reform initiated in § 62.623 did not 
contain the legislature’s express intent that the legislation was a 
matter of state-wide concern and based on the express intent of the 
Charter Ordinance that pension provision should be considered a 
matter of local concern, the trial court concluded that § 62.623 
violated the Home Rule Amendment by interfering with Milwaukee 
“local affairs” and, thus, was declared null and void.131
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently overturned the trial 
court’s holdings concerning the Home Rule Amendment, and found 
that the pension contributions changes were a matter of state-wide 
concern and, therefore, did not violate the Amendment.132 However, 
the use of the Home Rule Amendment illustrates how state 
constitutional provisions, not duplicated in the federal constitution, 
can play a pivotal role in deciding the fate of pension-reform 
legislation.133 That being said, the use of this device to find pension-
reform legislation invalid in the future appears to be somewhat 
limited, especially based on the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s recent 
interpretation of pension-reform legislation. In fact, unlike 
Milwaukee, not every municipality is likely to have a charter 
ordinance that seeks to unsuccessfully establish the pension system 
130. Id. (quoting Act of July 23, 1947, ch. 441, § 31, 1947 Wis. Sess. Law 
772, 789-90).
131. See id. at *10-11 (“[T]he court finds that the allocation of responsibility 
for contributions to the Milwaukee ERS between the City and its employees is a 
‘local affair’ for purposes of the Home Rule Amendment under Michalek. A statute 
that alters it is an unconstitutional intrusion into a matter reserved to the City of 
Milwaukee.”).
132. See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶ 123, 851 N.W.2d
337 (“We find that, given the facts presented in this case, the conflicting state and 
local regulations are of more paramount concern within the state as a whole than in 
the City of Milwaukee. Accordingly, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 62.623 and 
related statutes are primarily a matter of statewide concern.”).
133. And most states have home rule constitutional provisions. See Kenneth 
E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 269, 277-78 (1968) (finding thirty-three states have constitutional home rule 
amendments).
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as a matter of local control (although larger cities may be more 
sophisticated in this regard). In any event, one suspects that future 
pension-reform efforts in Wisconsin will have express language 
stating that the legislation is of state-wide concern, and such 
statements will be given great weight under current legal precedent 
in Wisconsin. Finally, Home Rule Amendment provisions only apply 
to local pension plans, not to state pension plans, for the 
straightforward reason that state plans do not involve the exercise of 
control over “local affairs.”134
B. Contract Clause Analysis
The Milwaukee public employee laborers were initially
successful at the trial court level in challenging the increased pension 
contribution under the Wisconsin Constitution’s contract clause,
though that determination was also overturned by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court.135 Because of the complexity of contract clause 
analysis, this Section is divided into a general overview of contract 
clause analysis and then a discussion of the trial court’s and 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s finding in the Madison Teachers case.
1. General Overview of Contract Clause Legal Analysis
The federal version of the Contract Clause, in pertinent part,
provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.”136 Similarly, the Wisconsin state 
constitution states, “No . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts, 
shall ever be passed.”137 Even though the respective legislatures 
wrote these provisions in unambiguous language, they have been 
interpreted to mean that they do not “make unlawful every state law 
that conflicts with any contract.”138 Instead, a court is tasked with 
134. See Madison Teachers, 2014 WI 99, ¶ 121 (noting that Act 10, without 
legal challenges “addresses a broad range of subjects, including . . . retirement 
contributions for public employees statewide”).
135. See id. ¶ 150 (“[W]e find nothing to suggest that the City of Milwaukee 
intended to classify contribution rates as a contractually protected ‘benefit.’
Consequently, there is no indication the Common Council, and by extension the 
State, bound itself to never modifying the contribution rates that fund the Milwaukee 
ERS.”).
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
137. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 12.
138. See Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 
F.2d 618, 638 (1st Cir. 1981) (italics omitted).
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“reconcil[ing] the strictures of the Contract Clause with the ‘essential 
attributes of sovereign power’ necessarily reserved by the States to 
safeguard the welfare of their citizens.”139
Based on this guidance, Contract Clause claims are analyzed 
either under a two- or three-pronged test.140 The first question is 
“whether the state law has . . . operated as a substantial impairment 
of a contractual relationship.”141 This first question is sometimes
divided into two questions (including in Wisconsin): (1) has the 
contract been impaired and (2) if so, is the impairment substantial?142
In any event, if the court concludes that contract was substantially 
impaired, the court next considers whether the impairment was 
“reasonable and necessary to serve an important [government] 
purpose.”143 Where the State is alleged to have impaired a public
contract to which it is a party, “less deference to a legislative 
determination of reasonableness and necessity is required, because 
‘the State’s self-interest is at stake.’”144
Wisconsin courts interpret the contract clause in the Wisconsin 
Constitution in the same manner as its counterpart in the federal 
Constitution.145 As in all constitutional challenges, when a law is 
challenged under the contract clause, there is a strong presumption 
that the law is constitutional.146 As far as the burden of proof, 
Wisconsin courts hold that the challenging party has the burden to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the law is unconstitutional.147
Although the language of the Wisconsin contract clause 
appears mandatory, it is not absolute148 and must sometimes yield to 
139. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21 (1977) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 
(1934)); see also Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 
400, 410 (1983).
140. See Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 59 (1st 
Cir. 1999).
141. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978).
142. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette, 323 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1982) (adopting a three-part inquiry to determine whether a state law was 
unconstitutional under the contract clause).
143. See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 25.
144. Parella, 173 F.3d at 59 (quoting U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 26; Parker v. 
Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. See Chappy v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 401 N.W.2d 568, 574 
(Wis. 1987).
146. Id. at 573.
147. Id. at 573-74.
148. Id. at 571, 574. 
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the state’s police power.149 Nevertheless, the contract clause still 
imposes some limits on the ability of a state to interfere with existing 
contractual relationships despite its police power.150
First, under this three-part contract clause test, Wisconsin 
courts have long held that contractual rights conferred pursuant to a 
municipal pension system are subject to the Wisconsin constitution’s 
contract clause and that a state law that alters the contract is 
impairing an existing contractual relationship.151 Second, courts 
consider whether the impairment is substantial.152 A party must show 
that the law interferes with the parties’ “expectations” to prove a 
substantial impairment.153 In this regard, a court should consider 
whether the law was foreseeable or even plausible at the time the 
contract was made.154 There is therefore a factual element to 
determining whether impairment is substantial.155 Arguing that the 
new statutory obligation itself is a substantial impairment is not
sufficient; rather, the party must provide evidence showing the effect 
of the impairment.156
Courts outside of Wisconsin have found that a law substantially 
impairs a contractual obligation when it unilaterally reduces
“‘contractually established, future state employee salary 
obligations.’”157 In this vein, courts have noted that interfering with 
employee pay creates a “‘financial hardship’” and “‘is not an 
insubstantial impairment to one confronted with monthly debt 
payments and daily expenses for food and the other necessities of 
life.’”158 Furthermore, when the state is faced with a budgetary 
149. See State ex rel. Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n of Milwaukee, Inc. v. 
Adamany, 219 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Wis. 1974).
150. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242 (1978).
151. See State ex rel. O’Neil v. Blied, 206 N.W. 213, 214 (Wis. 1925).
152. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette, 323 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1982).
153. See Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1018 (E.D. 
Wis. 2002). 
154. See id.
155. See Reserve Life, 323 N.W.2d at 178.
156. See id.
157. See Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1104 
(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 
708, 712 (Mass. 1995)).
158. See id. at 1105 (quoting Malahoff v. Saito, 140 P.3d 401, 407, 428 
(Haw. 2006); Ass’n of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters v. State, 588 N.E.2d 
51, 54 (N.Y. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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deficit, the legislature has many alternatives available to it, such as 
reducing state services not governed by contract and raising taxes.159
If the court determines that a contractual impairment is 
substantial, the third and final step is to examine the purpose of the 
state legislation to determine whether the impairment is justified160
and serves a significant and legitimate public interest.161 To 
determine whether a law is justified, the court balances the extent of 
impairment against the public purpose the law purportedly serves.162
In turn, the severity of impairment impacts the level of the court’s
scrutiny.163 Under this sliding scale approach, the court applies a low 
level of scrutiny when the impairment is insubstantial and stricter 
scrutiny when the impairment is more severe.164
2. Contract Clause Analysis in Madison Teachers
In Madison Teachers, the plaintiff city laborers claimed that the 
required pension contribution under § 62.623 substantially impaired, 
without justification, a contractual right they had under the 
Milwaukee ERS.165 More specifically, they pointed to Milwaukee 
Charter Ordinance § 36-13-3-g, which provides that all pension plan 
participants have a “‘vested and contractual right to the benefits in 
the amount and on the terms and conditions as provided in law on the 
date the combined fund is created.’”166
Such benefits, terms, and conditions under the Charter 
Ordinance, plaintiffs argued, included the city’s obligation to pay the 
employee’s share of retirement contributions.167 Accordingly,
“§ 63.623 alters that contractual right by prohibiting the City of 
Milwaukee from making those contributions.”168
159. See id. at 1106 (citing Opinion of the Justices (Furlough), 609 A.2d 
1204, 1211 (N.H. 1992)).
160. Reserve Life, 323 N.W.2d at 176.
161. Chappy v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 401 N.W.2d 568, 575
(Wis. 1987).
162. Univ. of Haw., 183 F.3d at 1107.
163. See Chappy, 401 N.W.2d at 575.
164. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978).
165. Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11-CV-3774, 2012 WL 
4041495, at *1 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Sept. 14, 2012), rev’d, 2014 WI 99, 851 N.W.2d 337.
166. Id. at *11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Milwaukee, Wis., 
Employes’ Retirement System Ordinance 36-13-2(g) (Jan. 19, 2001)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
1384 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1353
Applying the three-part contract clause analysis to the Madison 
Teachers case, the trial court first asked if the pension-reform law 
impaired a contract.169 Although the state maintained that “the 
relevant section of the charter ordinance does not create a contractual 
right to employer ‘contributions,’” the court agreed with the 
plaintiffs that the pension-reform measure impaired the city 
employees’ contractual rights under the Milwaukee ERS to have the 
city pay their pension contributions because “increasing the amount 
the employee is required to contribute diminishes the value of the 
benefit for which the employee has contracted.”170
Having found a contractual impairment, the court next 
considered whether the impairment was substantial.171 The State 
argued that it was not a substantial impairment both because 
municipal employee pension plans have been heavily regulated and 
because the impairment served a legitimate public purpose.172 The 
court disagreed and based its finding of substantiality on the 
unforeseeability of the state’s action.173 According to the court, the 
impairment was not foreseeable, and therefore substantial for three 
reasons:
First, because of the express language against retroactive impairment 
found in the ordinance. Second, because the state had not been involved 
regulating the Milwaukee ERS in the 64 years between Ch. 441 and Act 
10. Third, because the Home Rule Amendment and Ch. 441 barred the 
state from altering the Milwaukee ERS.174
The third and final step of the contract clause analysis required
the court to examine whether the substantial impairment was 
justified.175 This part of the test amounts to balancing the 
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *12.
172. Id. 
173. Id.
174. Id. Indeed, other cases from other courts stand for the proposition that 
state legislation that has the effect of reducing the pension rights of public 
employees to this magnitude would satisfy the requirement that the contractual 
impairment in question is substantial. See, e.g., Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. 
Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1099, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that statute delaying 
payment of wages for a six day period constituted a substantial impairment); Ass’n.
of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 
1991) (holding that statute that provided for withholding of ten days’ pay prior to 
retirement constituted substantial impairment); Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. 
Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 708, 710-11 (Mass. 1995) (finding that between two
and fifteen day furloughs of public employees constituted a substantial impairment).
175. Madison Teachers, Inc., 2012 WL 4041495, at *11.
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substantiality of the contract impairment against the interest that the 
state is seeking to serve by passing the legislation.176
Here, the court found persuasive a California Supreme Court 
case, Abbott v. City of Los Angeles,177 which held a similar increase 
in pension contributions to be an unjustified, substantial impairment 
of employee pension rights.178 In particular, the Abbott court found 
that neither the rising costs to the city nor speculation about future 
effects on taxpayers were enough to permit the contractual 
impairment.179 The California Supreme Court also found a lack of 
evidence that the new legislation was necessary for “the preservation 
or protection of the pension program.”180
The trial court in Madison Teachers came to the same 
conclusion, finding the substantial impairment of city employee 
pension rights unjustified based on budget concerns181 or the current 
health of the Milwaukee ERS.182 As already discussed, the Wisconsin 
Retirement System is one of the healthiest in the country and has not 
been significantly underfunded in the last twenty-five years.183
Moreover, pension plans are not generally funded by general tax 
revenue, but by compensation commitments to employees in the 
176. See State ex. rel. Cannon v. Moran, 331 N.W.2d 369, 376-78 (Wis. 
1983). 
177. 326 P.2d 484 (Cal. 1958).
178. Id. at 494.
179. Id. at 493-94.
180. Id. at 493.
181. Madison Teachers, Inc., 2012 WL 4041495, at *12. Wisconsin courts 
have limited the acceptable reasons for substantially impairing a pension contract to 
those dealing with the financial stability of the plan and do not consider other 
reasons, such as the need of the state to balance its budget. See Ass’n of State 
Prosecutors v. Milwaukee Cnty., 544 N.W.2d 888, 893-94 (Wis. 1996) 
(“[L]egislature[s] should retain a limited power to adjust or amend a retirement plan 
in certain situations, such as when it is necessary to preserve the actuarial soundness 
of a plan or to salvage financially troubled funds.”); Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. City
of Milwaukee, 588 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (not permitting the 
abrogation of vested pension rights for other purposes than those mentioned in 
Association of State Prosecutors: “[A]lthough the state has ‘a limited power to 
adjust or amend a retirement plan in certain situations,’ and may intervene to 
‘preserve the actuarial soundness of a plan or to salvage’ it if it is financially 
strapped, it may not raid it, even by a little bit.” (quoting Ass’n of State Prosecutors,
544 N.W.2d at 893))). 
182. Madison Teachers, Inc., 2012 WL 4041495, at *12 (“[T]he defendants 
do not meet plaintiffs’ prima facie case with any evidentiary facts or expressions of 
legislative intent which would support a finding that the challenged change was 
necessary for the preservation of the Milwaukee ERS.”).
183. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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form of deferred compensation.184 Consequently, the court concluded 
that the plaintiffs had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
pension-reform legislation amounts to a substantial impairment of 
their contractual rights without justification.185
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s
contract clause decision.186 More specifically, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court did not even undertake the substantiality or 
justification aspects of the contract clause test, but agreed with the 
State that the relevant section of the charter ordinance did not create 
a contractual right to employer contributions, and thus, there was no 
contractual impairment.187 Nevertheless, what can be gleaned from 
the trial court’s analysis is that such findings are highly fact-specific 
and turn on factors such as charter amendments and even the 
financial health of the pension system, which might make state 
action more necessary and justified. In any event, this contract clause 
analysis provides a useful example for how other contract clause 
challenges have been mounted, fought, and decided across different 
state pension systems.
C. Due Process Analysis
The last claim brought by the Milwaukee city employees in the 
Madison Teachers case alleged that the required contribution to the 
Milwaukee ERS amounted to a deprivation of their property without 
due process.188 Such claims require that a property interest be 
identified,189 and then only if a property interest is found does the 
court inquire whether the property interest was taken without due 
process.190
184. See Rick Ungar, The Wisconsin Lie Exposed–Taxpayers Actually 
Contribute Nothing to Public Employee Pensions, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2011, 11:56 
AM), http://blogs.forbes.com/rickungar/2011/02/25/the-wisconsin-lie-exposed-
taxpayers-actually-contribute-nothing-to-public-employee-pensions (“The pension 
plan is the direct result of deferred compensation—money that employees would 
have been paid as cash salary but choose, instead, to have placed in the state 
operated pension fund where the money can be professionally invested (at a lower 
cost of management) for the future.”).
185. Madison Teachers, Inc., 2012 WL 4041495, at *12.
186. Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶ 163, 851 N.W.2d 337.
187. See id. ¶¶ 149-55.
188. Madison Teachers, Inc., 2012 WL 4041495, at *13.
189. Id. 
190. Id.
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As to the first question, the court found the city employees had 
a property interest in their pension benefits because they had a
legitimate claim of entitlement to such benefits.191 More specifically, 
“[t]he ordinance . . . created an entitlement to a certain benefit of 
employment with the City of Milwaukee: payment by the city of the 
employee’s share of contributions to the pension plan.”192
The court, however, did not find that this property interest had 
been deprived without due process of law.193 This is because,
generally speaking, “‘legislative determination[s] provide[] all the 
process that is due.’”194 Although irrational and/or arbitrary 
legislation may still be found to violate due process, the court found 
that the plaintiffs had not provided evidence that the pension-reform 
legislation at issue in the case met that criterion and, therefore, 
dismissed the due process claim.195
It might be said with regard to due process claims that although 
it is relatively straightforward finding a property interest in pension 
benefits, it is much harder to show the legislature acted irrationally in 
passing pension-reform legislation, especially when the reasons 
concern budget deficits, underfunded pensions, or related matters.
On the other hand, it is interesting that the plaintiffs in Madison 
Teachers did not attempt to bring a takings clause claim.196 The 
absence of this claim may be based on the belief that takings claims,
whether based on federal or state constitutional provisions, largely 
rise or fall on the same basis as contract clause claims, and so an 
independent taking claim was not necessary.197 In any event, such 
takings claims have had limited success in public pension litigation 
historically.198
191. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433
(1982)).
195. Id.
196. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”).
197. See Beerman, supra note 34, at 63-64 (“With regard to state and local 
reforms, the Takings Clause is unlikely to add much to claims under the Contract 
Clause because a participant’s interest in pension promises is unlikely to be property 
unless it is found to be a contractual promise protected under the Contract Clause or 
state law pension doctrine.”); Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 68
(manuscript at 19) (“These [Takings] challenges are largely, but not entirely, 
derivative of the Contract Clause jurisprudence.”).
198. See Monahan, supra note 68, at 637 (“To date such challenges have 
been uniformly unsuccessful.”). However, “[p]resumably changes to participants 
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Moreover, this due process claim does not appear to have been 
appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and so of the three 
claims, it is the only one whose determination is final.
IV. A LOCAL PENSION CASE STUDY: THE DETROIT BANKRUPTCY 
LITIGATION
Not all local public pension issues concern state pension-
reform efforts. A number of municipalities have turned to the 
Bankruptcy Code to help alleviate the massive amounts of money 
owed to their retirement and other benefit plans.199 Of course, the 
most well-known example of this phenomenon involves the City of 
Detroit.200 When Detroit filed for bankruptcy protection in the 
summer of 2013, it was the largest municipal bankruptcy filing in 
American history.201
One of the more complicated issues surrounding the Detroit 
bankruptcy was the degree to which the bankruptcy court could cut 
back on pension benefits owed to employees and retirees given 
specific provisions in the Michigan State Constitution providing 
already receiving benefits could be successfully challenged under the takings 
clause.” Id. at 637 n.29.
199. That being said, pre-Detroit, only thirteen localities had actually sought 
bankruptcy protection over the past five years in the United States. See Mike 
Maciag, How Rare Are Municipal Bankruptcies?, GOVERNING (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.governing.com/blogs/by-the-numbers/municipal-bankruptcy-rate-and-
state-law-limitations.html.
200. Although Detroit is the most-well known municipal bankruptcy, there 
have been a number of others, especially in California in the past few years. In the 
Stockton, California bankruptcy, it is estimated that retirees lost, or will lose, 
anywhere from 30% to 70% of their pension and medical benefits through the 
restructuring process (though contributions to the California Public Employees’
Retirement System (CalPERS) have not been cut yet). See Laura Mahoney, Stockton 
Poised to Approve Ch. 9 Plan, Ask Bankruptcy Court for Approval, BLOOMBERG 
BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://news.bna.com/pdln/PDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=36982339&vname=p
bdnotallissues&jd=a0e2e0g8b0&split=0. But see Ed Mendel, Bankruptcy Judge 
May Rule Pensions Can Be Cut, CALPENSIONS (July 9, 2014), 
http://calpensions.com/2014/07/09/bankruptcy-judge-may-rule-pensions-can-be-cut/ 
(“A federal judge handling the Stockton bankruptcy may be moving toward a 
landmark ruling that CalPERS pensions can be cut . . . .”).
201. It is estimated that Detroit has 700,000 citizens, and that there are some 
23,000 pension recipients and 9,000 current public employees. See Editorial, For 
Detroit Retirees, Michigan’s Pension Promise Must Be Kept, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Aug. 1, 2013, 12:50 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130801/OPINION
01/308010019.
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protections against diminishment of pension rights.202 Going in to the 
Detroit bankruptcy litigation, it was unclear what protections, if any, 
Detroit public employees had under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code with 
regard to their pension rights because of the lack of precedent in this 
area.203 Although the Detroit bankruptcy proceedings have not yet 
concluded as of the writing of this Article, the bankruptcy court has 
made a number of important rulings concerning the relationship 
between state constitutional provisions protecting pension rights and 
the Bankruptcy Code, and a number of other important developments 
have also occurred. 
This Part discusses these developments in two Sections. The 
first Section provides a brief overview of American municipal 
bankruptcy law, with emphasis on creditor priority rights. The 
second Section then seeks to show how this aspect of municipal 
bankruptcy law has been applied, both formally and informally, to 
the pension claims of city employees and retirees in Detroit.
A. Overview of American Municipal Bankruptcy Law
Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code governs 
insolvencies involving municipalities.204 Municipalities cannot be 
forcibly liquidated, only required to restructure their debt.205
202. The Michigan Constitution states, “The accrued financial benefits of 
each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions 
shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired 
thereby.” MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24. Six other states provide similar protections for 
pension in their state constitutions. See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, 
Pension and Property Rights in Municipal Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
609, 639 (2014) (citing ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXIX, § 1,
cl. C; HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5; LA. CONST. art. X, pt. 
III, § 29; N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7).
203. Municipal bankruptcies are still very rare in the United States. See 
Bankrupt Cities, Municipalities List and Map, GOVERNING (Dec. 3, 2013), 
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-
defaults.html (“Overall bankrupt municipalities remain extremely rare. A Governing 
analysis estimated only one of every 1,668 eligible general-purpose local 
governments (0.06 percent) filed for bankruptcy protection over the past five 
years.”).
204. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (2012). States, on the other hand, cannot declare 
bankruptcy. States are not currently eligible for bankruptcy under Chapter 9. See id. 
§ 109 (not listing states as entities permitted to seek bankruptcy protection).
205. See KRISTEN DEJONG & BETH DOUGHERTY, NUVEEN ASSET MGMT.,
MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: A PRIMER ON CHAPTER 9, at 1, 4 (2014), available at 
http://www.nuveen.com/Home/Documents/Viewer.aspx?fileId=48362; see also 11 
U.S.C. §§ 301, 904 (prohibiting involuntary bankruptcies of municipalities).
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Importantly, states have to pass legislation providing that they assent 
to their municipalities seeking bankruptcy protection under Chapter 
9.206 Even if a state has given such assent,207 there is a very time-
consuming eligibility process where the federal bankruptcy court 
determines whether a municipality can actually go through the 
Chapter 9 process.208
Even if assent and eligibility are present, there are necessarily 
different considerations at play during a municipal bankruptcy than 
with a corporate one. For instance, there are issues concerning the 
need to continue to provide essential public services (like police, fire, 
sanitation, and utilities),209 and there are issues concerning 
municipalities’ ability to generate additional revenue through tax 
levies (as opposed to becoming more profitable through corporate 
reorganization).210
Municipal bankruptcy proceedings, however, do share some 
similarities with corporate bankruptcy proceedings. Of course, 
206. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (requiring explicit state government 
authorization for a local government to proceed as a debtor in bankruptcy). A
significant number of states, as many as half, have not given their assent to allow 
municipalities to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL DISTRESS 4 (2013), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2013/07/23/Pew_State_Role_in_Local_G
overnment_Financial_Distress.pdf. “These statutes [permitting Chapter 9 
bankruptcies] vary from states that give broad authority to municipalities to file 
(currently ten states) to those states that place restrictions on the right to file such as 
seeking the governor’s approval.” Sandrelli & Cross, supra note 22, at 405. The 
following twenty-two states do not appear to permit municipal bankruptcies: Alaska, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See 
Maciag, supra note 199.
207. See Daniel J. Freyberg, Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express 
State Authorization to Be a Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to 
Municipal Insolvency—and What Will States Do Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001, 
1008-16 (1997) (providing a list of states that currently permit municipal 
bankruptcies).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (setting out five eligibility factors for Chapter 9 
bankruptcy); see also Sandrelli & Cross, supra note 22, at 402 (“The process to 
establish eligibility has proven lengthy and costly, often taking over a year, with the 
result that a municipality may not always qualify for Chapter 9 relief.”).
209. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: 
A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 483-89
(1993) (discussing extent of a municipality’s residual obligations in bankruptcy).
210. See Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1035, 1104-07 (1997) (evaluating effectiveness of tax increases arising 
out of municipal bankruptcy).
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municipalities do have bondholder creditors and other lenders just 
like private companies.211 The other similarity is that both private 
companies and municipalities have employees and retirees who have 
pension and other benefit claims that may be substantially impacted 
when their employers seek bankruptcy protection.212 While pension
claims receive some preference or “priority” among competing
creditors under Chapter 11 corporate reorganizations,213 such claims 
do not receive priority treatment under Chapter 9.214
The lack of priority for employee–retiree creditors during the 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy process has significant implications. Priority 
creditor claims are given preference over other creditor claims and 
are satisfied first among the various claims.215 The concept of priority 
211. See id. at 1046-47 (discussing the status of municipal bondholders in 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings); see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 209,
at 429 (comparing creditor claims in private versus public bankruptcies).
212. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 202, at 611 (“[T]he current batch of 
municipal bankruptcies is complicated by the presence of another type of major 
creditor: the retiree.”).
213. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)-(5) (assigning “unsecured claims for 
contributions to an employee benefit plan” fifth priority). Combined with wages, 
these pension claims receive preferred status up to a capped amount ($12,475 as of 
April 1, 2013). See Bob Eisenbach, Going Up: Bankruptcy Dollar Amounts Will 
Increase on April 1, 2013, IN THE (RED) THE BUS. BANKR. BLOG (Feb. 26, 2013), 
http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2013/02/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/going-up-
bankruptcy-dollar-amounts-will-increase-on-april-1-2013. Legislation has been 
recently introduced to provide private-sector employees a greater priority in 
bankruptcy when their companies become bankrupt. See Diane Davis, Bill Requires 
Corporations to Give Workers, Retirees Fair Treatment in Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG 
BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (July 11, 2014), http://news.bna.com/pdln/
PDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=49583977&vname=pbdnotallissues&fcn=3&ws
n=488414000&fn=49583977&split=0 (“The bill, S. 2589, ‘Protecting Employees 
and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2014,’ would make several changes to 
Chapter 11 and put workers’ interests near the top when companies file for Chapter 
11 protection.”). The proposed law does not apply to municipal workers.
214. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 202, at 613-14 (“The [Bankruptcy] Code 
does not single out pensioners for priority in municipal bankruptcy . . . . [T]he 
pensioners have unsecured claims against the municipality to the extent that its 
pension obligations exceed the value of the assets held by the pension fund.”).
Indeed, at least one state has gone out of its way to make sure retirees are 
subordinated to the interests of municipal bondholders. See id. at 612 (“Most 
notably, the Rhode Island legislature recently took steps to ensure that bondholders 
would have priority over retirees in municipal bankruptcy.”) (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 45-12-1 (2011)).
215. 1 BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 8:10 (2014), available at
Westlaw. There are three ways in which claims come to enjoy priority:
First, the Bankruptcy Code . . . sometimes grants some creditors priority 
over others. For example, the Code grants domestic support obligations 
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is important because of the insolvent municipalities’ limited assets.216
Only those creditors who have the highest priorities are likely to 
have any of their claims against the municipality satisfied.217 Thus, if 
a pension claim is given no priority among a municipality’s
creditors, there is every chance that the employee will receive little 
to none of her pension payments.218 This is because underfunded 
municipal pension liabilities are considered unsecured and have the 
lowest priority among creditors.219 Indeed, absent bankruptcy-
specific priorities in Chapter 9 itself, employees and retirees would 
have to point to some state-based property right guarantee in order to 
be entitled to priority treatment in a bankruptcy proceeding.220
The lack of employee priority for their pension claims is 
problematic, but even with a greater creditor right, the bankruptcy 
process does not favor public employee pension claims. This is 
because employees are less likely, given the amount of money 
involved, the complexity of the process, and their lack of knowledge, 
to take advantage of whatever priority they receive for their 
priority over general creditors. Second, the Code recognizes contractual 
priority rights established between creditors. If one creditor agrees to 
subordinate its interest to another, bankruptcy gives effect to this 
agreement. Third, the Code recognizes non-bankruptcy law (typically state 
law) property rights that grant some creditors priority over others. For 
example, the Code recognizes the priority of a secured creditor over a 
general creditor with respect to its collateral.
Hynes & Walt, supra note 202, at 613 (footnotes omitted).
216. See Gordon W. Johnson, Insolvency and Social Protection: Employee 
Entitlements in the Event of Employer Insolvency, in ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., ASIAN INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS: CLOSING THE IMPLEMENTATION 
GAP 223, 227-28 (2007).
217. See 1 BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 215, § 8:10.
218. See id.
219. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 202, at 613-14 (“[P]ensioners have 
unsecured claims against the municipality to the extent that its pension obligations 
exceed the value of the assets held by the pension fund.”).
220. See id. at 616-17 (adopting “the assumption under current law that, 
absent a bankruptcy-specific priority, priority requires an enforceable property 
right”). That being said, Hynes and Walt do not believe the Michigan state 
constitutional provisions protecting against diminishment of pensions qualifies as 
such a property right that requires priority protection for Detroit employees’ pension 
rights. Id. at 616 (“The most plausible interpretation of these provisions is that they 
provide nothing more than a contract right similar to a municipal bond that everyone 
agrees can be modified in bankruptcy. . . . They implicitly rely on the principle that 
bankruptcy law must respect priority rights established outside bankruptcy by state 
law. However, current law does not adopt this principle. Although bankruptcy law 
once explicitly recognized state law priority rights, Congress amended the 
Bankruptcy Act in 1938 to largely displace state law priorities.”).
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employment claims.221 Not only that, but even if employees do 
manage to negotiate the process, file a timely claim, and receive a 
fairly large portion of what they are owed, they will likely not 
receive it for many years given how long it takes the bankruptcy 
process to be completed.222 Thus, if the aim of the social protection 
system is to protect already-earned employee pensions when their 
public employer becomes insolvent in a more timely and efficient 
manner, the granting of a priority alone may not be the best method 
for doing so.223 The Detroit municipal bankruptcy highlights the 
current unsatisfactory nature of the American municipal bankruptcy 
system when it comes to employee pensions.
221. See Johnson, supra note 216, at 229. Even if employees are represented 
by a union, unions do not have a formal role to play under current bankruptcy law. 
See Andrew B. Dawson, Labor Activism in Bankruptcy (Feb. 18, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (manuscript at 27) (on file with author), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2397911 (observing, in the Chapter 11 context, that unions 
have little formal role to play in bankruptcy reorganization proceedings).
Nevertheless, Professor Dawson maintains that “[l]abor unions, bargaining on behalf 
of these workers, can offer [the workers’ insider] perspective and experience to 
other stakeholders and potential purchasers who may lack the monitoring power but 
who have the power to use that monitoring knowledge.” Id. (manuscript at 27-28).
Similarly, unions can, and have, played a similar role in municipal bankruptcies. For 
instance, “[t]he biggest unions, including the American Federation of State, County 
and Municipal Employees and the United Auto Workers, negotiated deals that 
reduced the size of proposed pension cuts” in the Detroit bankruptcy negotiations. 
See Steven Church, Detroit Workers, Retirees Endorse City’s Benefit Cutting-
Bankruptcy Plan, BLOOMBERG BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (July 22, 2014), 
http://news.bna.com/pdln/PDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=50355375&vname=p
bdnotallissues&jd=a0f3q7w1x7&split=0.
222. See Johnson, supra note 216, at 229 (noting the long, drawn-out nature 
of liquidation in bankruptcy where even employees who have priority rights will still 
be subject to a drawn out wait for their claim to be realized, as opposed to guarantee 
schemes where there can be immediate payment while the guarantor—who is better 
situated to handle the time delay—is subrogated to insolvency claim).
223. Indeed, because of this dynamic, many countries in the private sector 
provide for guarantee funds or insurance schemes. The United States has such an 
insurance scheme for DB pension plans in the private sector through the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (2012). 
Although the payments available under such guarantee funds are limited to certain 
amounts for specified time periods prior to the insolvency filing, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
§ 507(a)(4)-(5) (limiting U.S. claims to within 180 days of insolvency through 
PBGC), they do provide a timelier and surer method for protecting the already-
earned pension claims of employees, see Johnson, supra note 216, at 229.
Unfortunately, no such guarantee schemes exists for public pension claims in the 
United States. Id. at 227-28.
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B. The Detroit Bankruptcy Litigation
Detroit Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr, with the acquiescence 
of Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, filed for bankruptcy in the 
summer of 2013, claiming that the city had a deficit of $18 billion, of 
which $5.7 billion represented retiree healthcare liabilities and $3.5 
billion represented pension liabilities.224 Even before the bankruptcy 
petition was filed, public employee unions and the pension funds 
went on the offensive to protect city employee pensions from the 
bankruptcy process.225 Citing the Michigan State Constitution 
provisions that protect pension obligations from diminishment,226 the 
plaintiffs argued that the Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding had to be 
stopped before it interfered with these state constitutional rights.227
Although the unions and pension funds were initially able to get a 
state court judge to stay the bankruptcy proceedings until the scope 
of the constitutional provision could be determined,228 that victory 
was short-lived. A couple of days later, a state court of appeals 
vacated that stay order and allowed the bankruptcy proceeding to go 
forward.229
224. See Bernie Woodall & Joseph Lichterman, Detroit Manager Scores 
First Win over Unions in Bankruptcy Bid, REUTERS (July 24, 2013, 6:57 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/24/us-usa-detroit-
idUSBRE96N05Z20130724. 
225. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Detroit Bankruptcy Unconstitutional,
Judge Rules in Pension Case, ABA J. (July 19, 2013, 10:59 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_grants_pension_lawyers_motion_det
roit_bankruptcy/ (“During the hearing the judge said she planned to issue an order 
blocking the bankruptcy filing. However Rick Snyder, the governor of Michigan, 
and Kevyn Orr, Detroit’s emergency manager, filed the bankruptcy petition five 
minutes before the Thursday hearing began.”).
226. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each 
pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be 
a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired 
thereby.”).
227. Ward, supra note 225.
228. Id. (“[Governor] Snyder and [Emergency City Manager] Orr violated 
the constitution by proceeding with the bankruptcy filing, because they knew it 
would reduce pension benefits, [Judge] Aquilina said.”).
229. See Martha Neil, Appeals Court Puts Brakes on State Judge’s Order 
Derailing Detroit Bankruptcy, ABA J. (July 23, 2013, 8:30 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/appeals_court_puts_brakes_on_state_judge
s_order_derailing_detroit_bankruptc/ (“Injunctive relief granted Friday by a 
Michigan judge who ordered the city of Detroit to withdraw its Chapter 9 
bankruptcy filing was stayed Tuesday by the state court of appeals.”).
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From there, Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes found that he 
had jurisdiction over all Detroit city assets, including its pension 
funds, stayed all related state court proceedings against state officials 
who filed the bankruptcy, and ruled that all objections concerning the 
bankruptcy processes’ impact on pension claims had to be heard in 
bankruptcy court.230 He then held the necessary eligibility hearings 
under Chapter 9, and over the vehement objections of the city unions 
and pension funds, found that Detroit was eligible for bankruptcy.231
A number of public unions and pension funds responded by filing 
appeals in federal appellate court to stop the bankruptcy process 
from going forward.232
At the same time, Judge Rhodes concluded that the Michigan 
State Constitution did not prevent pension obligations from being 
subject to the bankruptcy process.233 He concluded that pension 
obligations were essentially contractual in nature and subject to 
adjustment under the Bankruptcy Code like any under contractual 
obligation.234 He came to this conclusion notwithstanding that “DB 
pensions are a form of deferred compensation that offsets lower 
salaries in the public sector, especially in highly skilled professional 
occupations.”235 Perhaps even more worrisome for public employees 
230. See Woodall & Lichterman, supra note 224 (“Judge Steven Rhodes 
ordered three lawsuits filed by city workers, retirees and pension funds be halted and 
extended that stay to suits against Michigan’s governor, treasurer and Detroit’s
emergency manager. Rhodes’ action ensures that the only path to fight the city’s
Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition runs through his courtroom in downtown Detroit.”).
231. See Nathan Bomey, Brent Snavely & Alisa Priddle, Judge Rules Detroit 
Eligible for Historic Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, Says Pensions Can Be Cut, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (Dec. 3, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20131203/
NEWS01/312030084/Detroit-bankruptcy-eligibility-Steven-Rhodes-Chapter-9-
Kevyn-Orr (“Rhodes—in a surprise decision this morning—also said he’ll allow 
pension cuts in Detroit’s bankruptcy. Rhodes emphasized that he won’t necessarily 
agree to pension cuts in the city’s final reorganization plan unless the entire plan is 
fair and equitable.”).
232. Id.; see In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013), 
appeal docketed, No. 14-1211 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 2014).
233. In re Detroit, 504 B.R. at 154. 
234. See id. (“Because under the Michigan Constitution, pension rights are 
contractual rights, they are subject to impairment in a federal bankruptcy 
proceeding.”). At the same time, the bankruptcy court also stated that “[n]o one 
should interpret this holding . . . to mean that the Court will necessarily confirm any 
plan of adjustment that impairs pensions.” Id. 
235. See Miller, supra note 1. It is not at all clear that Judge Rhodes’s
reasoning that employee pensions are mere contractual obligations subject to 
impairment in bankruptcy represents a proper understanding of pensions as already 
earned, vested property rights. See Lorraine A. Schmall, Keeping Employer 
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and retirees, Judge Rhodes also concluded that pension claims had
no priority under Chapter 9 and thus would be treated as unsecured 
claims.236
These legal conclusions appeared to have spurred various 
public employees and retirees to bargain in the shadow of the formal 
bankruptcy process237 and engage in informal mediation to come up 
with an agreement that would permit the bankruptcy process to go 
forward,238 while sparing large parts of the pension obligations owed 
to employees and retirees.239 For instance, under an agreement
between the city and groups representing retired police and 
firefighters, “[p]olice and firefighter retirees would see no cuts in 
their monthly pensions, while cost-of-living increases would be 
Promises When Relational Incentives No Longer Pertain: “Right Sizing” and 
Employee Benefits, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 276, 278 (2000) (“[E]mployees own 
their pension expectancies—what they thought they were promised in exchange for 
working at a rate of pay that reflects contributions to their deferred benefits.”).
236. See Brent Snavely, Joe Guillen, Eric D. Lawrence & Alisa Priddle, 
Retirees Brace for Pension Cuts in Wake of Detroit Bankruptcy Ruling, Detroit Free 
Press (Dec. 3, 2013, 10:36 PM), 
http://archive.freep.com/article/20131203/NEWS01/312030159/Detroit-pensions-
Judge-Rhodes-Kevyn-Orr (“‘Pension benefits are a contractual obligation of a 
municipality and not entitled to any heightened protection in bankruptcy,’ Rhodes 
said.”).
237. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 202, at 633 (“Even if creditors routinely 
consent to plans of reorganization, it is likely that they bargain in the shadow of 
what would happen in the absence of their consent.”).
238. But see Appellants’ Brief at 10, Mich. Council 25 v. City of Detroit, No. 
14-1211 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2014) (arguing that Chapter 9 does not comply with the 
requirements of the federal Constitution’s Contract Clause). The unions have argued 
that Chapter 9, in and of itself, violates the Federal Constitution, as the point of 
municipal bankruptcy law is 
to give the States a federal license and a federal vehicle to accomplish 
indirectly a result—the adjustment of their municipalities’ contract debts 
in a federal bankruptcy proceeding in accordance with a state-authorized 
and state-proposed plan of adjustment—that the Contract Clause in Article 
I, § 10 of the Federal Constitution prohibits the States from accomplishing 
directly through state legislation.
Id. This claim was dismissed at the trial court level and has yet to be decided by the 
Sixth Circuit (and may not be if a bankruptcy compromise goes through). See In re
Detroit, 504 B.R. at 147. It does, however, present a potential avenue to be explored 
by unions and other pension beneficiaries seeking to protect their benefits.
239. See Steven Church, Detroit Reaches Accord on Health Benefits, 
Pensions with Police, Firefighter Retirees, BLOOMBERG BNA PENSION & BENEFITS 
DAILY (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://news.bna.com/pdln/PDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=44880369&vname=p
bdnotallissues&jd=a0e9c4p3j1&split=0.
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reduced by more than half.”240 The deal was helped by pledges by 
private foundations and the state of Michigan to kick in almost one
billion dollars to both continue to pay active retirees and to make 
sure current employees also will have pensions when they retire.241
Almost simultaneously with the retired police and firefighters, the 
city reached deals with two major pension funds.242 These 
compromises require the pension plans to drop pending appeals 
concerning the impact of the Michigan Constitution on the 
bankruptcy process.243 In late July 2014, impacted city employees 
and retirees voted overwhelmingly in favor of these compromises.244
On November 7, 2014, after a two-month trial, the bankruptcy court 
approved the city’s plan of adjustment, allowing Detroit to exit from 
bankruptcy.245
240. Id.
241. Id. (“The deal, reached April 15, can go through only if the city wins 
approval of a proposal from the state and private foundations, who offered $816 
million to bolster the city’s pension systems in exchange for a plan that would shield 
Detroit’s art collection from a forced sale.”); Mary Williams Walsh, Detroit 
Bankruptcy Deadline May Be Missed, Imperiling State Funds, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 
2014, at B3 (“The grand bargain calls for $466 million from private foundations and 
the Detroit Institute of Arts and a $350 million appropriation from the state.”).
242. See Steven Church, Detroit Pension Fund for General Employees 
Reaches Tentative Deal with City on Cuts, BLOOMBERG BNA PENSION & BENEFITS 
DAILY (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://news.bna.com/pdln/PDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=44949719&vname=p
bdnotallissues&fcn=4&wsn=489405500&fn=44949719&split=0 (“General 
employees’ pensions would [shrink] by 4.5 percent, instead of the 26 percent 
initially proposed by . . . emergency manager [Kevyn Orr], according to a person 
familiar with the settlement. They would lose an annual cost-of-living 
adjustment . . . .”).
243. Nora Macaluso, Judge Approves Detroit Adjustment Plan; State Aid, 
Creditors’ Votes Awaited, BLOOMBERG BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (May 6,
2014), 
http://news.bna.com/pdln/PDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=46049895&vname=p
bdnotallissues&fcn=7&wsn=489182000&fn=46049895&split=0 (“As part of the 
‘grand bargain’ with the state and foundations, pensioners and city employees will 
have to give up their rights to sue to block the bankruptcy proceedings.”).
244. See Church, supra note 221 (“About 82 percent of the current and 
retired police and firefighters voted for the proposal, while about 73 percent of 
general city workers and retirees supported it.”).
245. See Nathan Bomey, Matt Helms & Joe Guillen, Judge Oks Bankruptcy 
Plan; A “Miraculous Outcome,” DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/07/rhodes-
bankruptcy-decision/18648093/ (“Judge Steven Rhodes ruled that Detroit’s
comprehensive restructuring plan is fair and feasible, providing the legal authority 
for the city to slash more than $7 billion in unsecured liabilities and reinvest $1.4 
billion over 10 years in public services and blight removal.”).
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In all, the lesson appears to be that even with specific state 
constitutional language seeking to protect against pension cutbacks, 
no pension rights are safe from diminishment once the bankruptcy 
process commences.246 Although the bankruptcy process eventually 
led to relatively minimal cuts in pension benefits for both employees 
and retirees in Detroit,247 it should be remembered that without the 
state and private foundations providing money to the pension funds, 
the outcome of this process could have been very different. That 
being said, it should also be re-emphasized that municipal 
bankruptcies cannot even take place in many states that have not 
passed legislation authorizing municipal bankruptcies.248 In states 
where municipal bankruptcies are permitted, it would appear that to 
provide priority protection to pension claims it would be necessary to 
amend Chapter 9 of the Code to provide such a priority (an unlikely 
scenario),249 or states would have to specifically designate pensions 
as a property right, which could then receive a non-bankruptcy 
priority under the Code (perhaps more likely at least in some 
states).250 In the meantime, because of the current uncertainty 
surrounding the municipal bankruptcy process, municipalities and 
their employees would do well to pass comprehensive pension 
reform, which will allow them to address current pension 
underfunding and thereby help avoid the need to resort to bankruptcy 
proceedings.
V. A HYBRID APPROACH TO PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN THE 
UNITED STATES: LIMITED ERISA EXPANSION AND UNIFORM LAW 
ADOPTION
Of course, the best way to avoid bankruptcy and other forms of 
litigation discussed in this Article is not just by trying to harness 
246. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 202, at 639 (“[B]ankruptcy law displaces 
priorities established by state law, treating pension obligations as unsecured debt 
entitled to no special priority.”).
247. See Bomey, Helms & Guillen, supra note 245.
248. See supra note 206 (identifying states that do not permit municipal 
bankruptcies).
249. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 202, at 660 (“One approach would be to 
provide pensions priority status with the priority the Bankruptcy Code currently 
gives to certain other sorts of unsecured claims.”).
250. See id. at 651 (“Either of two property rights can be created by 
legislation: a statutory lien or a statutory trust. Properly designed, both can give 
pension obligations priority in payment over general creditors and even secured 
creditors of a municipality.”) (footnote omitted).
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better arguments for future public pension litigation. The best 
strategy moving forward is to eliminate the root causes behind the 
various forms of public pension litigation in the first place. And 
given that most litigation, bankruptcy or otherwise, is caused by 
underfunding of public pension funds,251 there needs to be a 
fundamental reassessment of how government entities fund, govern, 
and legally protect public pension rights.
A. Previous Attempts to Harmonize American Public Pension Law
Commentators in the past have remarked on at least two 
potential methods for providing more consistent and uniform 
standards for public pension plans across the board252: expand 
ERISA’s funding, fiduciary, and other provisions to all public 
pension plans253 and/or provide a model uniform public pension law 
with many of the same ERISA provisions that states could adopt 
with additional emphasis on issues unique to public pension plans.254
Each of these approaches has already been attempted or 
contemplated to one degree or another. In fact, when ERISA was 
first enacted in 1974, Congress considered covering governmental 
plans along with private-sector plans.255 As discussed above, this 
proposal was rejected both because it was thought that taxpayers 
would back underfunded pension plans if states or municipalities 
became financially distressed256 and because of federalism concerns 
that the federal government would trench upon traditional areas of 
251. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
252. A third way has been recently advanced by Professor O’Reilly, which 
would have the federal government bail out insolvent state and local pension plans 
using its Spending Clause authority to impose ERISA-type regulation. See O’Reilly,
supra note 34 (manuscript at 2-3). Because I think a federal bailout of public 
pension plans is highly unlikely in the current political environment, I focus here 
instead on expanding ERISA to federal pension plans and using a uniform law 
approach to provide the necessary regulation for state and local pension plans. See 
also Monahan, supra note 34 (manuscript at 41-47) (describing how more 
effectively written and enforced funding provisions in state constitutions could help 
correct public pension underfunding issues).
253. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 24, at 292. 
254. See Mendales, supra note 24, at 509-11.
255. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 24, at 297 (“When ERISA was 
being debated by Congress, active consideration was given to including 
governmental plans within its reach.”); Mendales, supra note 24, at 508-09
(“Congress itself believed that it could not apply ERISA to the states based on these 
issues when it originally enacted the legislation in 1974.”).
256. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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state law concern.257 Two other reasons were advanced for not 
applying ERISA to governmental plans: “Congress thought private 
pension plans were more likely than public pension plans to 
incorporate unduly restrictive and unfriendly provisions that 
prevented employees from vesting,”258 and “Congress was worried 
that imposing minimum funding and similar standards would have 
‘entail[ed] unacceptable cost implications to governmental 
entities.’”259 Since that time, although a provision was placed in 
ERISA to study the possibility of expanding the law to governmental 
plans260 and a number of pieces of legislation were introduced to do 
just that every year between 1978 and 1984,261 no such law 
eliminating the governmental plan exemption has ever been 
enacted.262
On the other hand, the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws put forward in 1997 a uniform public 
pension law: the Uniform Management of Public Employee 
Retirement Systems Act (UMPERSA).263 This uniform law seeks to: 
(1) ensure all pension assets are held in trust; (2) impose prudent 
investment rules; (3) establish trustee liability for fiduciary breaches; 
257. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 24, at 297; see also Gualandi v. 
Adams, 385 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2004) (“One Senator commented that ‘State and 
local governments must be allowed to make their own determination of the best 
method to protect the pension rights of municipal and state employees.’” (quoting 
119 CONG. REC. 7422 (1973) (statement of Sen. Lloyd Bensten))); Roy v. Teachers 
Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 878 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1989) (“We think it clear that the 
congressional goal of preserving federalism requires that when a pension plan has 
been established by a governmental entity for its employees and the governmental 
entity’s status as employer has not changed, the plan must be exempt from ERISA 
as a governmental plan.”).
258. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 24, at 297 (citing Rose v. Long 
Island R.R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1987); H.R. REP. NO. 93-533,
at 43 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4667).
259. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 165 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4830); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 44, reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4668.
260. 29 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012). 
261. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 24, at 297 (citing Ridgeley A. 
Scott, Misuse of Public Pension Assets: White Collar Crimes and Other Offenses, 26 
IND. L. REV. 589, 590 (1993)).
262. See O’Reilly, supra note 34 (manuscript at 16).
263. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM 
MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS ACt 1 (1997), available 
at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement
_systems/mpersa_final_97.pdf.
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(4) set up required disclosures to plan participants; and (5) establish 
an enforcement schemes for violation of the Act.264 UMPERSA 
establishes important new rules concerning disclosure and fiduciary 
issues, where the thought was that significant “shortcomings in the 
operation of these plans . . . could be fixed at no appreciable cost.”265
The reporter and other drafters of UMPERSA made the 
considered decision not to draft a more comprehensive uniform law, 
which would have also covered funding standards and termination 
insurance.266 There was a fear that state legislatures would not enact 
anything that would have restricted their budgetary freedom.267
Since its drafting, only two states, Wyoming and Maryland, 
have adopted UMPERSA.268 This may be because the law is the 
classic “political orphan,” with no interest group caring enough to
overcome legislative inertia. In any event, given the continued 
unwillingness of politicians to fund their public pension plans, and 
with public awareness about these issues at an all-time high, the time 
has come to revisit uniform public pension laws and consider 
expanding UMPERSA to provide funding standards and other 
provisions that respond more directly to the current public pension 
funding crisis.269
264. See Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act Summary,
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=
Management%20of%20Public%20Employee%20Retirement%20Systems%20Act 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2014). See generally Steven L. Willborn, Public Pensions and 
the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act, 51 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 141 (1998) (providing a summary of UMPERSA by its reporter).
265. See E-mail from John H. Langbein, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale 
Law School, one of the drafters of UMPERSA, to author (June 6, 2014) (on file with 
author).
266. See id.
267. See id. Of course, the underfunding of public pension funds had not 
reached public awareness in 1997 when the reporters drafted the uniform law and 
would not become a national issue until after the global recession commenced in 
2009. Id.
268. See Legislative Enactment Status: Management of Public Employee 
Retirement Systems Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeMap.aspx?title=Management%20of%20Public%20Employee%20Retire
ment%20Systems%20Act (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
269. See Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 68 (manuscript at 39, 52) 
(continuing to advocate for adoption of UMPERSA, but also for guarantee fund in 
case of public plan insolvency). 
1402 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1353
B. Hybrid Approach for Standardizing American Public Pension 
Law
This Article proposes a hybrid approach to standardize the best 
public pension law practices at all levels of American government, 
largely in accordance with pension principles established under 
ERISA. This Section is further divided into an exploration of 
expanding ERISA to cover federal pension plans and an examination 
of formulating a new and improved uniform public pension law for 
adoption by the states.
1. Expanding ERISA Coverage to Federal Pension Plans
To avoid the federalism problem associated with having the 
federal government take over state and local pension regulation and 
also to avoid a cumbersome vast expansion of ERISA and PBGC 
insurance coverage, the first part of the hybrid proposal is to limit 
ERISA expansion only to federal employee pension plans.
This approach makes sense when one reconsiders each of the 
reasons Congress chose not to subject public pension plans to ERISA 
in the first place. First, and most obviously, arguments about 
federalism have no role to play if the federal government moves to 
regulate federal benefit plans under ERISA. Second, Congress 
mistakenly believed in the 1970s that underfunded public pension 
plans would be bailed out by taxpayers if they encountered financial 
problems.270 But with the recent spate of municipal bankruptcies and 
the significant underfunding of federal, state, and local pension 
funds, history has shown that the federal government and states are 
either unwilling or incapable of raising tax revenue to bail out failing 
pension plans.271 Third, Congress was worried that imposing ERISA 
minimum funding requirements would cause the financial burden of 
those requirements to fall on taxpayers.272 Yet again, history has 
proven that without effective minimum funding standards, public 
pension funds have become significantly underfunded (as federal 
pension plans are right now),273 and the taxpayers (or employees if 
state and local government are unwilling or unable to raise taxes)
will take an even a greater financial hit as a result.
270. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 24, at 297.
271. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
273. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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In all, none of the justifications for excluding governmental 
plans in toto from ERISA coverage seem to apply with any force to 
excluding federal pension plans alone. It may be argued that,
generally speaking, federal plans are not in as bad of shape as state 
and local plans, and that the laws regulating federal plans are more in 
keeping with the strict regulations of ERISA. Yet, as described 
above, the federal pension trust became underfunded in the first 
place both because the CSRA did not take into account employee 
pay raises and COLAs, and because Congress failed to pre-fund
these funds on an actuarial sound basis.274 This dynamic has led the 
federal pension trust to have an actuarial liability of $761.5 billion.275
Surely, additional reporting, participation, eligibility, benefit accrual, 
funding, fiduciary, and enforcement mechanisms provided by ERISA 
would go a long way in reducing the pension underfunding that the 
federal system now faces and ensuring that such financial issues do 
not recur in the future.
Logistically, federal legislation should be passed to partially lift
the governmental plan exemption so that federal employee pensions 
under the FERS, CSRA, and TSP would be subject to the various 
ERISA pension plan requirements (and also subject to plan 
qualification under the Internal Revenue Code).276 There might need 
to be additional provisions added as well considering the employer 
providing pension benefits is the federal government. So, for 
instance, provisions would be required to permit federal employee 
participants and beneficiaries to sue the federal government under 
ERISA, special fiduciary and conflict-of-interest rules might be 
needed for federal employees operating these plans (though such 
rules could be modeled on those in place already under FERS and 
the CSRA), and some consideration should be given to the type of 
glide path or transitional rules that should be instituted to allow the 
current federal employee pension plans to meet the minimum 
funding requirements of ERISA.
In any event, this would be a relatively modest expansion of 
ERISA as far as employees covered, as there are about 2.7 million 
274. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
275. See supra text accompanying note 82.
276. See Monahan & Thukral, supra note 24, at 294 (“In addition to ERISA 
requirements, retirement plans also must comply with provisions in the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (the Code) in order to receive certain tax benefits. While 
ERISA exempts governmental plans entirely from its reach, the Code still imposes 
some, though significantly reduced, requirements on governmental plans.”).
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federal employees in the United States.277 On the other hand, given 
recent congressional bills to require federal employees to contribute 
to their pensions and/or to migrate to a DC plan,278 ERISA might 
provide the necessary protective framework under which such 
pension plan design implementations could occur.
2. Construction of a Uniform, State-Wide Public Pension Law 
for State and Local Pension Plans
Whereas federal employee pension plans would be subject to 
ERISA, state and local pension plans would continue to be exempt 
under this hybrid proposal. Instead, and in place of the current 
UMPERSA uniform law, this Article proposes adopting a far more 
comprehensive model law that would require each state to have one 
public pension system for the entire state; contain ERISA-like 
provisions concerning reporting and disclosure requirements, 
fiduciary requirements, and meaningful remedial provisions; and
also contain provisions specifically suited to address unique issues 
surrounding public pension plans. In thinking about what such a 
uniform law should look like, this Article borrows liberally from the 
recent scholarship of Professor Mendales on a new uniform public 
employee benefit law.279
First, Professor Mendales’ uniform law proposal requires that 
“all benefit funds maintained by a state, its subdivisions, and 
instrumentalities be subsumed under common administration by state 
agencies selected in a nonpolitical way and be subject to uniform 
rules on financing and accountability.”280 Such a state-wide uniform
law would have a number of advantages. A state-wide plan that 
covers all state and local employees would provide uniform funding, 
fiduciary, and enforcement mechanisms applicable to all public 
employees in the state and would ensure that local plans would not 
277. See Floyd Norris, Bloated Government? Federal Employment at 47-
Year Low, NY TIMES (Oct. 22, 2013, 10:32 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/bloated-government-federal-
employment-at-47-year-low/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
278. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
279. Whereas the focus of this Article’s proposal is on public pensions, 
Professor Mendales’ proposal more broadly seek to cover all public employee 
benefit plans sponsored by states and municipalities. See Mendales, supra note 24,
at 522.
280. Id. at 510.
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have different or inconsistent provisions.281 It would also likely make 
it easier to “pass the model act without separately drafting and 
wrangling over individual programs for different groups of 
employees.”282 Having all public pension plans in one state pension 
fund would also have the advantages that come with economies of 
scale, including access to more sophisticated financial advisors and 
actuaries, more competitively priced investment products, and the 
ability to diversify pension assets among a larger group of 
investments.283 Indeed, recognizing these advantages, some local 
pension plans are already looking to merge into large state-wide 
plans.284 Finally, Mendales proposes compacts or more informal 
arrangements be entered into by states that adopt the uniform code to 
“address common problems faced by states in administering their 
respective codes and for coordinating state efforts to keep their codes 
uniform on important issues.”285 In contrast, this Article favors the
more incremental approach based on informal arrangements between 
the states, as interstate compacts would require federal involvement, 
which would complicate state pension plan regulation 
unnecessarily.286
281. Having state-wide plans operating under a uniform code, in turn, 
“would provide a template to assist legislatures in dealing with difficult issues such 
as funding, investing and administering trust funds, structuring benefits, and 
ensuring the integrity of benefit funds.” Id. at 514. It would also help overcome local 
pension plans’ vulnerability to political pressure, which causes local plans “to 
underestimate the long-term costs of benefits and, in turn, required employer and 
employee contributions.” Id. at 518.
282. Id. at 511.
283. Id. at 512 (arguing for “common funding, investment, and 
administration of state and municipal funds,” which would “permit local funds to 
employ more sophisticated financial personnel, would permit greater diversification 
of investments, and would enhance bargaining power vis-à-vis securities issuers and 
intermediaries”).
284. See, e.g., Rick Baert, Legislation Opens Door for Duluth Teachers to 
Join Minnesota Teachers Pension Fund, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (May 27, 2014, 
4:23 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20140527/ONLINE/140529887/
legislation-opens-door-for-duluth-teachers-to-join-minnesota-teachers-pension-fund
(“The $210 million Duluth (Minn.) Teachers’ Retirement Fund Association could be 
merged into the $18 billion Minnesota Teachers Retirement Association, St. Paul, as 
a result of legislation signed last week by Minnesota Gov. Mark Dayton.”). Part of 
the reason for the merger was that “[t]he Duluth board wanted the merger to reduce 
its liabilities.” Id.
285. See Mendales, supra note 24, at 539. For further discussion of interstate 
compacts for pooling resources for benefit funds, see generally id. at 546-47.
286. Id. at 546 n.167 (“Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the federal 
Constitution allows states to enter compacts with each other if specifically permitted 
by Congress.”).
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Second, such model legislation would provide for adequate 
funding provisions and ensure that the promised benefits were paid 
on a timely basis.287 Many of the funding requirements would be 
drawn directly from the ERISA context, while other provisions 
would require plans to engage in internal de-risking strategies. One 
example of an internal approach is “hedging” against interest rate 
changes,288 while another example is “[l]iability-driven invest[ing],”
in which an effort is made to match the characteristics of the 
investment assets underlying the pension promise with payout 
obligations to pensioners.289 Such hedging or liability-driven 
investing would reduce the risks associated with plan investment.290
Similarly, strong fiduciary language, combined with minimum pre-
funding requirements, would make it more difficult for politicians 
and bureaucrats to kick the public pension funding can down the 
block.291 Of course, a number of the basic ERISA provisions 
involving eligibility, vesting, and benefit accruals would also be 
added.292 Perhaps down the line, even a public-based PBGC 
insurance scheme could be put into place when a pension plan is 
terminated for lack of funding or because of the insolvency of a 
municipality.293
287. Id. at 511.
288. See Alex Pekker & Meghan Elwell, Pension Funds Should Derisk Now,
PENSION & INVESTMENTS (Mar. 11, 2014, 10:02 PM), http://www.pionline.com/
article/20140311/ONLINE/140319974/pension-funds-should-derisk-now.
289. See Jayne Gest, How to Reduce Your Defined Benefit Risk, Even After 
Freezing the Plan, SMART BUS. (Jan. 1, 2013, 1:27 AM), http://www.sbnonline.com/
article/how-to-reduce-your-defined-benefit-risk-even-after-freezing-the-plan-tegrit/.
290. See Mendales, supra note 24, at 511-12 (maintaining that uniform law 
should require using “qualified actuaries to match contributions and investment 
returns with predicted payouts to beneficiaries”).
291. See id. at 512, 518. Mendales also argues for the model law to have an 
Office of the Inspector General “to police the integrity of plan fiduciaries and their 
advisors.” Id. at 512, 538-39 (footnote omitted). Professor David Webber, for his 
part, argues that many public pension plans already have many of the same fiduciary 
obligations imposed on them that currently apply in the ERISA context. See 
generally David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 12-13) (on file with author). To the extent 
that state pension codes already apply ERISA fiduciary duties, it will be easier to 
transition to the proposed uniform law.
292. See Mendales, supra note 24, at 512-13 (laying out ERISA provisions 
that model law would borrow). 
293. See Paul M. Secunda, An Analysis of the Treatment of Employee 
Pension and Wage Claims in Insolvency and Under Guarantee Schemes in OECD 
Countries: Comparative Law Lessons for Detroit and the United States, 41
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 867, 936 (2014) (arguing, based on comparative study, for 
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On the other hand, it would probably be better to keep the 
model law as a framework and not seek to push public plans into 
deciding whether to maintain a DB structure, as opposed to taking on 
DC plan or cash balance plan alternatives. Plans could also decide 
within the strictures of this model law whether to offer public 
pension plan participation to private-sector workers currently without 
employer-sponsored plans. Those types of decisions would still be 
left to decision makers within individual states.294
This type of flexibility is important given that states may have 
different finances that might justify different funding levels and 
different pension regimes. So perhaps a state like Florida, with a 
large elderly population, would want one type of pension scheme, 
while Alaska, with its oil money and sovereign wealth fund, might 
choose a different pension structure altogether. Although this 
proposal believes one state-wide scheme for each state makes the 
most sense for the reasons discussed above, different states, playing 
off the uniform law, could still have different variations (just as is 
possible under ERISA today for private-sector plans). And of course, 
even if states have substantially similar public pension schemes on 
paper, state courts are likely to interpret those rules differently 
(though the same is true with interpretation of other uniform rule 
schemes like the Uniform Commercial Code or the Uniform Trade 
Secret Act).
Finally, the model law should have provisions that ERISA does 
not have that are specifically focused on the needs of public 
employees and employers. For instance, Professor Mendales 
identifies the following issues that need to be addressed by a uniform 
public pension law, which are not covered by ERISA: “adequate 
public funding, protecting state credit, and states’ ability to offer 
attractive benefit packages to their employees.”295 Additionally, the 
uniform law should have more extensive disclosure requirements, 
providing plan participants with information regarding the cost, risk, 
and expected returns on investments.296 This more extensive 
disclosure could then also help “reduce the cost of borrowing funds 
establishment of federal pension and wage guarantee fund covering both public-
sector and private-sector employees). Mendales contemplates a similar PBGC-like 
insurance scheme in cases of public benefit plan emergencies, see Mendales, supra 
note 24, at 539-43, as does Anenson and her co-authors, see Anenson, Slabaugh & 
Lahey, supra note 68 (manuscript at 52-53).
294. See supra text accompanying note 62.
295. See Mendales, supra note 24, at 508. 
296. Id. at 514. 
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by states and their instrumentalities by giving prospective purchasers 
of municipal securities improved information on the risks underlying 
such securities.”297 Other public employee-specific provisions could 
address: (1) the need for greater transparency given that 
governmental decision making is involved; (2) state budgeting 
processes and state-specific accounting standards; (3) the lack of 
Social Security coverage for some public employees; and (4) 
mandatory retirement ages for police and firefighters.
In all, such a uniform code could provide the necessary funding 
mechanism for public pension plans, the wherewithal to enforce 
those funding promises, and disclosures that would keep public 
employees and municipal investors informed about the financial 
status of the pension plan. Although some kinks would inevitably 
need to be worked out, and interest groups assuaged, before 
implementation of such a uniform public pension law could occur, 
such legislation would provide an important step forward in avoiding 
expensive and time-consuming state and local public pension 
litigation.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to highlight the plight of 
American public pension plans. The public is demanding significant 
public pension reform thanks to lax legal regimes that have permitted 
significant pension underfunding. Pension underfunding exists at all 
levels of American government and inevitably leads to litigation 
concerning various pension-reform measures that seek either to 
require additional employee contributions or to cut back on benefits 
for retirees. As a result, government officials, employees, and 
retirees are in the midst of litigating for the future of American 
public pensions. In the end, society as a whole loses regardless of the 
outcome of the litigation because either employees and retirees lose 
hard-earned pension benefits (and, thus, become destitute and must 
rely on government welfare programs), or states and municipalities,
without needed pension cuts, spiral further out of financial control 
and, perhaps, even into bankruptcy.
The start of a solution lies with harmonizing and standardizing 
the existing muddle of American public pension law. Although 
ERISA is far from perfect in regulating private-sector pension plans 
in the United States, it nevertheless has provided uniform standards 
297. Id. 
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for management and administration of occupational retirement plans.
In order to replicate that same consistency, this Article proposes a
hybrid approach, which seeks to avoid some of the federalism pitfalls 
of previous public pension-reform proposals. By applying ERISA 
only to federal pension plans, and by permitting the states to adopt 
comprehensive uniform public pension legislation, public pension 
plans can take advantage of a reliable and stringent pension 
framework that will make future underfunding and fiduciary lapses 
less likely. 

